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Increased climate risks pose challenges of combining climate mitigation and adaptation 
goals into building designs. These two goals are often misaligned, as adaptation measures use 
additional materials and equipment that are sources of carbon emissions. This phenomenon 
causes building design to involve tradeoffs between enhancing structural resilience and 
reducing emissions. This dissertation addresses the need to identify the optimal investment 
mechanisms for the design of buildings in hurricane-prone regions. Dynamic decision-making 
models are developed for individual investors to characterize emission trading and risk 
mitigation behaviors over a building’s lifecycle. The models enable the following outcomes: 
(i) evaluation and selection of baseline rules for sectoral emission trading, (ii) ability to reflect 
resilience goals in the building design, construction and maintenance, and to balance between 
climate mitigation and adaptation goals for a wide range of building examples, and (iii) policy 
 
 
implications for improving emission trading efficiencies and achieving environmental and 
economic sustainability at community level. 
Modeling results indicate that the trouble of voluntary emission trading is mainly attributed 
to imperfect market information and future climate risks. The uncertainty in predicting 
emissions and potential baseline manipulation leads to the production of non-additional carbon 
offsets and an extension of sectoral emission caps. This situation is even bleaker when emission 
trading is implemented in the areas that have exposure to significant risks of catastrophic events 
such as hurricanes. The results reveal a trend of a transition from long-advocated low-carbon 
investment to a risk-oriented portfolio for building retrofits in hurricane-prone regions. The 
risk mitigation efforts should be pursued with discretion on the accuracy of insurance premium 
discounts. Meanwhile, subsidies for emission abatements are recommended to accommodate 
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Chapter 1 Overview 
While mandated in a few sectors, the actions on global warming are primarily voluntary for many 
organizations and individuals. The type, quality and quantity of the voluntary actions are affected by the 
resource use decision of the organizations and individuals. When the benefits of a climate action accrue 
primarily to those who take decisions, they are more likely to cooperate in achieving the climate targets 
(Jack et al., 2008). However, climate change is a global public good, which implies that the benefits of a 
particular climate action flow mainly to others (Nordhaus, 2007). This makes public interests and the 
interests of the action takers misaligned. The difference in private and social benefits, or the issue of 
"externalities", results in a classic market failure: the unregulated organizations and individuals may not be 
willing to take actions on global warming in their own right. This logic explains the failure of meeting 
climate goals in many countries.   
In recently years, voluntary carbon offset programs have emerged as a policy solution for realigning 
the social and private benefits related to the climate actions. The programs are based on a straightforward 
proposition: compensate for carbon reduction efforts by allowing the reductions to be traded at a certain 
price. The program functions outside of the compliance schemes and encourage the carbon reduction on a 
voluntary basis. With just under $4.5 billion traded over the past decade, voluntary demand for carbon 
offsets is impactful well beyond the markets' relatively small size (Hamrick & Goldstein, 2015). This 
demand and resulting finance create new industries and unlock cleaner forms of affordable energy in the 
unregulated sectors.  
Even with promising economic opportunities, the voluntary offset programs have faced substantial 
criticism in the last few years. There is evidence that a significant number of offsets come from projects 
that would have been undertaken anyway (Millard-Ball, 2013). These non-additional offsets, when traded 
to the regulated entities, implicitly expand the emission caps in compliance schemes and result in failing 




baseline against which emission reductions can be certified as carbon offsets, may be systematically biased. 
The bias is particularly prominent in evaluating project-based reduction against a counterfactual baseline, 
that is, a level of emissions that would occur in the absence of the project (Fischer, 2005). As the certifying 
agency is limited in its ability to propose such a counterfactual baseline, it must consign this task to the 
individual project proponents. This leaves great uncertainty regarding the integrity of baseline 
determination. 
As an alternative approach, a performance baseline addresses this weakness in that it no longer relies on 
evaluating individual projects but uses a pre-defined baseline to streamline the process of determining 
additionality (VCS, 2012). In this way, the performance baseline can establish an emissions threshold for 
a class of project activities. Individual projects that meet or exceed the threshold automatically qualify 
as additional projects, obviating the need for each project to determine additionality in its own right. 
However, the performance baseline is also criticized for producing non-additional offsets (Fischer, 2005). 
Because it is uniformly applied to a class of project activities, it inevitably over-allocates offsets to some 
projects and under-allocates offsets to others. The performance baseline is, therefore, also at risk of 
promoting less cost-effective investment projects and allocating non-additional offsets to those projects. 
Chapter 2 is therefore centered on the aforementioned baseline rules, project-based baseline and 
performance baseline, and compares their effects on sectoral emission mitigation and compliance costs. A 
dynamic optimization model is created to characterize mitigation decisions of project proponents over a 
building’s life cycle. This chapter contributes to the existing literature on additionality baselines by 
quantifying the trade-offs between the revenue and incremental costs regarding emission abatement. In 
contrast to Millard-Ball (2013), Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) and Fischer (2005), who emphasize 
conceptual design and describe cost and revenue curves in a general sense, this chapter uses the 
commercial building sector as an example and collects real technology and cost information to 
characterize a real investment environment. The building sector emits 33% of all global emissions while 




2008). This finding implies that if properly explored, gains from engaging the building sector in voluntary 
trading would be extremely attractive. 
Chapter 2 also contributes to the existing literature by incorporating the co-benefits of emission 
abatement into the decision model. Thus, the project payback includes not only offset sales but also other 
possible revenues. In the case of the commercial building sector, the co-benefit of emission abatement is 
utility savings. Some of the existing literature disregards such co-benefits and exaggerates the non-
additionality issue. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, if the co-benefits are properly considered, 
the optimal baseline can avoid some of the non-additional projects and effectively alleviate global warming. 
Chapter 2 assumes that performance baselines are set by regulators who have either perfect or imperfect 
information about the costs and emissions of projects. In practice, regulators are often less informed than 
project proponents; therefore, the baselines are more likely to be privately defined even for sectoral 
crediting. The primary concern with privately defined baselines is that baseline developers may exert their 
powers to manipulate the baselines, leading to increases in sectoral emission caps (Fischer, 2005). For 
example, baseline developers may lower the baseline to expel competitors from the offset programs. The 
decrease in offset supply drives up the offset prices, which creates more surpluses for the developers but 
risks forgoing the benefits of cost-effective offset projects. It is also possible that the developers increase 
the baseline above the counterfactual business-as-usual (BAU) emission, allowing themselves to sell non-
additional offsets. The non-additional offsets either represent a damage cost due to global warming or an 
increase in the transaction costs within this sector. Even though such manipulation is reduced to some extent 
by third-party verifications, it plays a role in the programs that reward offsets based on additionality (Jack, 
2008). 
Therefore, Chapter 3 focuses on the motivation for manipulating baselines and its impact on the 
reduction of global emissions. The hypothesis is that baseline developers can always gain more by deviating 
from the unbiased baseline, which is an emission threshold that surpasses the 80th percentile of comparable 




modeled as a response to the sectoral performance baseline. Observing the baseline, self-informed project 
proponents decide whether to participate and how much to reduce their emissions.  Each project proponent’s 
emission reduction is a function of the baseline. (ii) One of the project proponents in the program is chosen 
to be the baseline developer who solves an optimization problem in the context of adverse selection. The 
developer takes others’ response functions as given and uses them to set the baseline that maximizes its 
expected payoffs. (iii) The functional forms are specified in the context of the U.S. commercial building 
sector. Closed-form solutions for the optimal baseline are derived, which are compared against the unbiased 
baseline to demonstrate that the baseline manipulation has a high chance of occurring. 
Chapter 3 highlights the significance of answering a question, namely, who should be the baseline 
developer. My theoretical results show that the extent to which the baseline is manipulated highly depends 
on who is assigned to be the baseline developer. The more the baseline developer emits, the more likely the 
developer exerts its power to manipulate the baseline. A case study of the U.S. building sector reveals that, 
because of the notably low price elasticity of the offset supply, the privately defined baseline is often 
positively deviated and produces more non-additional carbon offsets.  
While Chapters 2 and 3 have emphasized on carbon mitigation, Chapter 4 steps beyond it and discuss 
the necessity of climate adaptation for commercial buildings in disaster-prone regions. Carbon mitigation 
policies, such as the voluntary offset programs, are economically efficient in an environment where the 
projects can gain stable revenues in the presence of carbon price signal; however, they are suspected to be 
less attractive in areas at substantial risks from catastrophic events such as hurricanes and floods (Guikema, 
2009). These events cause damage to the local buildings and result in significant direct costs such as 
restoration costs and indirect costs such as loss of business revenue and economic growth in impacted areas. 
To balance against the future costs of structure failure, project proponents have been advised to pay extra 
up-front costs to enhance structural resilience, and to prepare, absorb, recover from and adapt to natural 




The way to address climate risks depends on the investment decision that trades off, at least implicitly, 
emission abatement (slowing down the global warming) for resilience management (adapting to the global 
warming). As a traditional solution, adopting emission abatement measures can save energy cost and 
generate revenues from carbon offset sales. Kneifel (2010) showed that these measures can be used to save 
energy use in new commercial buildings by 20-30% on average. The life-cycle cost can be reduced by 3% 
on average and up to over 6% for some building types and locations. However, these revenue sources may 
be interrupted due to structure failures in disasters, making the abatement investment less attractive than 
ever. As global temperature continues increasing and more areas are subjected to severe natural disasters, 
a vast majority of property and wealth is under the risk of significant damages. UNISDR (2012) reported 
that the annual loss induced by infrastructure failure amounted to about $55 billion in the United States. 
This number is expected to increase because of a combined effect of climate change and increased coastal 
inventory of assets (Ayyub et al., 2012). The expected damages emphasize the need to enhance resilience 
to sustain building’s operation and accelerate post-disaster recovery. According to the studies of ULI (2015) 
on South Florida Resort, the use of hurricane resilience measures can lower annual expected damages by 
an estimated $500,000, offering a significant reduction in annual operating expenses. This makes resilience 
management an important addition to traditional low-carbon development paths, and if it is cooperates 
properly with emission abatements, will lead to a more sustainable and resilient community.  
Therefore, Chapter 4 builds on the investment decision model in Chapter 2 and characterizes the 
decision problem in the context of disaster-prone regions where the buildings are exposed to the risk of 
hurricane events. Different from Chapter 2 in which the project proponents only decide the amount of GHGs 
to reduce, in Chapter 4 they are offered with an option of enhancing structural resilience for adapting to 
hurricane events in the future. A dynamic decision-making model is developed for individual investors to 
maximize their expected payoffs over a building’s lifecycle. The model is built upon the evaluation of non-
stationarity hurricane damages and building’s emission performances under different mitigation scenarios. 




emission abatements, hurricane mitigation, and the interaction between those two actions.  This chapter 
enables the following outcomes: (i) development of a hybridized decision model that allows the balance 
between resilience and sustainability objectives, (ii) ability to reflect resilience goals in the building design, 
construction and maintenance, and (iii) application of the model to a selected county to demonstrate its 
ability to handle a wide range of building examples, and provide policy implications for a county’s 
environmental and economic sustainability. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Dissertation framework and key scientific questions 
 
The roadmap of this dissertation is displayed in Figure 1.1. Key contributions are summarized as 
follows. 
• This dissertation evaluates the environmental and cost effects of different baseline approaches for 
voluntary emission trading. The results will be valuable for policy makers to understand which 
baseline approach is more cost-effective in which circumstances, and guide the selection of baselines 
for a particular sector. While this dissertation only demonstrates the results for the commercial 
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• This dissertation is the first attempt of studying baseline manipulation in voluntary offset programs. 
Past studies almost exclusively assume performance baselines are set by regulators who have either 
perfect or imperfect information about the costs and emissions of projects. In practice, the baselines 
are more likely to be privately defined and have a risk of being manipulated. This dissertation models 
baseline manipulation behaviors in the context of adverse selection, where participants can self-select 
into the market. The results will shed light on the motivation and consequences of baseline 
manipulation, and provide policy suggestions on the regulation of baseline integrity. 
• To realign the conflicts between climate mitigation and adaptation goals, this dissertation develops a 
framework to find the optimal investment allocation between mitigation and adaptation measures for 
the design of buildings in hurricane-prone regions. The optimal portfolio reflects low-carbon and 
resilience goals in the building design, construction and maintenance. The framework is applied at 
county level to demonstrate its ability to handle a wide range of building examples, and provide policy 







Chapter 2 Value of Performance Baseline in Voluntary Carbon Trading under 
Uncertainty 
Abstract 
Voluntary carbon trading has long been criticized for producing a large number of non-additional 
offsets. The reason for this production lies primarily in the use of a project-based baseline that due to 
information asymmetries, misrepresents the business-as-usual (BAU) emissions of individual projects. The 
performance baseline was recently introduced as an alternative to the project-based baseline. The 
performance baseline does not rely on evaluating individual BAU emissions, but rather, it uses a pre-
defined threshold to streamline the process of determining additionality. This chapter compares the effects 
of the two baseline approaches on sectoral emission mitigation and compliance costs. In the context of the 
U.S. commercial building sector, a dynamic optimization model is created to characterize mitigation 
decisions of project proponents over a building’s life cycle. The results indicate that while both baseline 
approaches are capable of reducing sectoral emissions when information is perfect, a performance baseline 
is especially advantageous in cases of imperfect information and uncertain price environments, as it is expected 
to reduce non-additional offsets by 19% and increase private profits by 2%. Nevertheless, special attention 
should be given to the potential inequity in offset allocation with performance baselines in sectors that are 
highly diversified in emission magnitudes. 
2.1 Introduction 
To address the threat of climate change, high polluting sectors in the United States are regulated 
through compliance schemes and assigned legally binding emission caps. These caps constitute a finite 
supply of emission allowances that can be traded among the regulated entities. In contrast to the 
compliance schemes, voluntary offset programs provide a market that can encourage unregulated entities 




and counted toward compliance goals in the regulated entities. Therefore, this program contributes to 
internalizing emissions cost and provides incentives for seeking cost-effective means to control carbon 
emissions (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
The voluntary offset program, however, has faced substantial criticism in the last few years, and there 
is evidence that a significant number of offsets come from projects that would have been undertaken 
anyway (Millard-Ball, 2013). These non-additional offsets, when traded to the regulated entities, implicitly 
expand the emission caps in compliance schemes and result in failing to achieve the desired emission 
targets. This means that the threshold for determining additionality, a baseline against which emission 
reductions can be certified as carbon offsets, may be systematically biased. The bias is particularly 
prominent in evaluating project-based reduction against a counterfactual baseline, that is, a level of emissions 
that would occur in the absence of the project (Fischer, 2005). As the certifying agency is limited in its 
ability to propose such a counterfactual baseline, it must consign this task to the individual project 
proponents. This leaves great uncertainty regarding the integrity of baseline determination. 
As an alternative approach, a performance baseline addresses this weakness in that it no longer relies on 
evaluating individual projects but uses a pre-defined baseline to streamline the process of determining 
additionality (VCS, 2012). In this way, the performance baseline can establish an emissions threshold for 
a class of project activities. Individual projects that meet or exceed the threshold automatically qualify 
as additional projects, obviating the need for each project to determine additionality in its own right. 
However, the performance baseline is also criticized for producing non-additional offsets (Fischer, 2005). 
Because it is uniformly applied to a class of project activities, it inevitably over-allocates offsets to some 
projects and under-allocates offsets to others. The performance baseline is, therefore, also at risk of 
promoting less cost-effective investment projects and allocating non-additional offsets to those projects. 
The impact of an additionality baseline, either a project-based baseline or a performance baseline, has 
been extensively studied under the Clean Development Mechanism, where the baseline is applied to 




developed countries (Bento et al., 2015; Strand & Rosendahl, 2012; Kallbekken, 2007). The impact analysis 
centered on alternative baseline rules, such as the rules of historical emissions, expected emissions, and 
industry-average emissions. Different baseline rules represent different trade-offs between the concerns of 
information accuracy, participation incentives and investment cost-effectiveness. Because project 
performance is often context dependent, there has not been a consensus on the most effective baseline 
rule for a universal case, indicating that additional research is needed to evaluate which baseline rule is 
the most appropriate in which circumstance. In addition, previous studies raise a concern regarding the co-
benefit of carbon mitigation, e.g., production efficiency improvement. The co-benefit sometimes enables 
a project to be self-profitable, which is, by definition, one type of non-additional project. This issue, 
however, has yet to be incorporated into a quantitative analysis. Thus, there is a need to advance the 
understanding of the cost-effectiveness of mitigation projects, taking into account the potential co-benefits 
of such projects as well as the nature of the price and technology uncertainties. 
This chapter offers three main contributions. First, it contributes to the existing literature on 
additionality baseline by quantifying the trade-offs between the revenue and incremental costs regarding 
emission abatement. In contrast to Millard-Ball (2013), Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) and Fischer (2005), 
who emphasize conceptual design and describe cost and revenue curves in a general sense, this study uses 
the commercial building sector as an example and collects real technology and cost information to 
characterize a real investment environment. The building sector emits 33% of all global emissions while 
only accounts for less than 5% of emission reductions in the market (Robert & Kummert, 2012; Kollmuss, 
2008). This finding implies that if properly explored, gains from engaging the building sector in voluntary 
trading would be extremely attractive. 
Second, the study builds on the previous static analysis of abatement decisions and extends it to a dynamic 
decision process. Dynamic decision analysis is important because emission abatement in different periods is 
not always independent. For example, installing exterior wall insulation in a particular year can contribute to 




are independent and that a project proponent chooses to opt in only if its one-time revenue exceeds the 
one-time cost (Millard-Ball, 2013; Kallbekken, 2007; Fischer, 2005). This chapter, however, takes the 
project proponent as a forward-looking decision maker who discounts all future expected revenues. 
Third, this study incorporates the co-benefit of emission abatement into the decision model. Thus, the 
project payback includes not only offset sales but also other possible revenues. In the case of the commercial 
building sector, the co-benefit of emission abatement is utility savings. Some of the existing literature 
disregards such co-benefits and exaggerates the non-additionality issue. However, as demonstrated in this 
chapter, if the co-benefits are properly considered, the optimal baseline can avoid some of the non-additional 
projects and effectively alleviate global warming. 
2.2 Optimization Model of Dynamic Emissions Abatement 
This section characterizes a decision framework for investing in building carbon mitigation. A two-stage 
dynamic optimization problem is formulated to model the selection of energy standards and emission 
abatement technologies over a building’s life cycle. Two baseline approaches are defined and incorporated 
into the model to study the baseline effects on carbon mitigation and offset allocation.  
2.2.1 Two-Stage decision problem 
Project proponents, designated an i = 1,…, N, design, construct and operate buildings. The building 
designs meet, at a minimum, the energy standard ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, 
and Air-Conditioning Engineers) 90.1-2007. Complying with higher energy standards is voluntary and 
requires extra up-front investments. However, investments in energy conservation are compensated with 
annual utility savings and carbon offsets. Only when the compensation exceeds the up-front investments, the 
project proponents are willing to reduce energy consumption beyond ASHRAE 90.1-2007. The project 





Figure 2.1  Framework of the Firm Decision Problem 
 
Each firm makes a two-step decision to reduce energy consumption and associated carbon emissions, as 
depicted in Figure 2.1. In the first step, the firm designs a building by choosing one of the ASHRAE 
energy standards, namely, ASHRAE 90.1-2007 (standard A), ASHRAE 90.1-2010 (standard B) or 
ASHRAE 90.1-2013 (standard C). Later versions of the energy standard represents more stringent energy 
efficiency requirements. Each firm has a BAU emission 𝑧0(𝐴) based on the minimum requirement of 
ASHRAE 90.1-2007. If it does not increase energy efficiency, its emission remains as 𝑧0(𝐴)  and its 
incremental cost is zero. If the firm chooses a higher energy standard, for example, ASHRAE 90.1-2010, 
the annual emission is reduced to 𝑧0(𝐵) = 𝑧0(𝐴) − ∆𝑧 and the incremental cost is 𝑖𝑐(𝐵). Assuming 
every unit of emission corresponds to γ utility bill, the annual utility saving is γ[𝑧0(𝐵) − 𝑧0(𝐴)]. The use 
of ASHRAE 90.1-2013 is associated with the annual emission 𝑧0(𝐶), and the incremental cost is 𝑖𝑐(𝐶). 
Each firm is assigned an additionality baseline 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 by the regulator. Reductions below 𝑏𝑖,𝑡  can be sold as 
offsets at an exogenous price p if the firm opts in. Assuming risk neutrality, the firm will choose a standard 
x that satisfies 
𝑥 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥{ℕ(𝑝[𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧
0(𝑥)] + 𝛾[𝑧0(𝑥) − 𝑧0(𝐴)])} − 𝑖𝑐(𝑥), 𝑥 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 (2.1) 
where 𝑝[𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧


















Case 2: Retrofit project




respectively. ℕ(∙) represents the net present value of the annual paybacks, a linear function that converts 
future annual uniform cash flow to the present value. 
Once the firm has chosen an energy standard for its initial construction, in the second step, it makes 
decisions about the retrofit plan over the building’s life cycle. Each firm has its initial emission 𝑧𝑖,0. If 
the firm does not retrofit, its abatement cost is zero, and its emission is 𝑧𝑖,1 = 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝜖𝑖,1, where 𝜖𝑖,1 
reflects the BAU emission adjustment due to an external environment change from t = 0 to t = 1. Otherwise, 
it chooses abatement 𝑟𝑖,1 > 0, incurs an abatement cost 𝑐𝑖,1 = ℂ(𝑟𝑖,1) and reduces emissions to 𝑧𝑖,1 =
𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑟𝑖,1 + 𝜖𝑖,1. At t = 1, the firm is faced with an additionality baseline 𝑏𝑖,1, and only the emissions 
below 𝑏𝑖,1 can be sold as offsets at an exogenous price p1. At t = 2, the firm observes a new price p2 and 
decides whether to further reduce emissions. If the firm does not further reduce emissions, its abatement cost 
remains at 𝑐𝑖,1 and its emission is 𝑧𝑖,2 = 𝑧𝑖,1 + 𝜖𝑖,2. Otherwise, it chooses abatement 𝑟𝑖,2 > 0 and has a 
cumulative abatement such that 𝑞𝑖,2 = 𝑟𝑖,1 + 𝑟𝑖,2. The associated abatement cost is 𝑐𝑖,2 = ℂ(𝑞𝑖,2), and the 
emission is reduced to 𝑧𝑖,2 = 𝑧𝑖,1 − 𝑞𝑖,2 + 𝜖𝑖,2. In this context, a risk-neutral firm will maximize its life 
cycle profit by Equation 2.2. Accordingly, the firm will participate in the program if and only if 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0. 
max
𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡(𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) + ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1 
s. t.   𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
         𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(2.2) 
2.2.2  Additionality baseline 
The additionality baseline is still in its infant stage of development, and there is no consensus on 
establishing an effective baseline in the voluntary offset program. The baseline is normally defined in two 
ways, specifically, project-based baseline and performance baseline. The project-based baseline is the 
counterfactual BAU emission level of the building, which represents an emission level without the 





0(𝑥∗) adjusted for external environment change 𝜖𝑖,𝑡. Accordingly, the baseline varies 
from building to building and changes over time. 
The performance baseline, in contrast, is often a sector-wide threshold that is uniformly applied to all 
buildings without considering individual differences. The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) established in its Marrakech Accords that an additionality baseline is 
sufficient if the baseline surpasses the 80th percentile of comparable peers (UNFCCC, 2006). The 
comparable peers include the project activities undertaken in the previous five years in similar social, 
economic, environmental and technological contexts. For simplicity, it is assumed herein that all firms in this 
study are comparable peers and therefore comprise the bundle for the performance baseline. It is also 
assumed that the BAU emission 𝑧𝑖
0(𝑥∗)  follows a normal distribution with mean 𝑧?̅?
0  and standard 
deviation σ(𝑧𝑖
0) . Given this, the performance baseline is 𝑧?̅?
0 − 0.84σ(𝑧𝑖
0) and is adjusted for external 
environment change 𝜖𝑖,𝑡. This represents the 80
th percentile threshold of all building BAU emissions. 
As previously stated, two alternative baseline approaches are offered that the regulator may adopt in the 
voluntary offset program. The approaches are expressed as follows. 
 
Project-based baseline: 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = {
𝑧𝑖
0(𝐴), t = 0
𝑧𝑖
0(𝑥∗) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , t ≥ 1
 
(2.3) 
Performance baseline: 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = {
𝑧?̅?
0(𝐴) − 0.84σ(𝑧𝑖
0), t = 0
𝑧𝑖
0(𝑥∗) − 0.84σ(𝑧𝑖
0) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , t ≥ 1
 
2.3 Estimation of Building Emissions 
Linear regression models are created to estimate building emission 𝑧𝑖,𝑡  and identify available 
techniques to reduce emissions 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑞𝑖,𝑡. From a life cycle perspective, building emissions consist of 




2.3.1 Building construction emissions 
Building construction emissions consist of the emissions from construction material production, 
transportation, and installation. These processes consume energy, such as coal, diesel and natural gas, all of 
which emit carbon dioxide during combustion. Emission from electricity consumption is traced back to the 
upstream electricity generation station, where carbon dioxide is emitted as a byproduct of fuel combustion. 
In addition to the energy-related activities, carbon dioxide is also emitted from certain non-energy 
chemical reaction processes, e.g., the process of converting limestone to lime. 
The above emission sources are estimated using the Athena Impact Estimator for Commercial 
Buildings. This estimator accounts for the emissions of major building assemblies that include columns 
and beams, floors, roofs, foundations and walls. The design of the prototype buildings is referred to as the 
medium office sample project provided by the Athena Institute. The prototype buildings are medium-
sized office buildings that have three floors and a total of 53,660 ft2. They are designed to meet the 
ASHRAE 90.1-2007, 90.1-2010, and 90.1-2013, respectively. The standard increases the requirements for 
envelope insulation (R-value increase) from 2007 to 2013, thus the thickness of the insulation for roofs and 
walls are increased to meet different ASHRAE energy standards in different climatic zones. All of the 
buildings use the same insulation materials, specifically, polystyrene expanded for roofs and blown 
cellulose for exterior walls. On average, the insulation materials for the ASHRAE 90.1-2010 are 3 mm 
and 6 mm thicker for roofs and walls compared to the ASHRAE 90.1-2007. 
Estimation results suggest that building construction emissions are between 5,527 gCO2e/ft
2 and 5,570 
gCO2e/ft
2 depending on the energy standard adopted. Because the emission differences are exceedingly 
small, the initial construction emission is not an important factor in energy standard selection (optimization 
step 1). 
2.3.2 Building operation emissions 




Studio Energy Plus module. The module computes energy consumption as a function of building type, 
climate condition, and energy standard. This study restricts building type to medium-sized office buildings 
and focuses on the impact of climate conditions and design standards on building emissions. The same 
prototype buildings as those used in Section 2.3.1 are used here. A linear regression model is created to 
express the change of building emissions with respect to climate conditions and energy standards. The 
model is expressed as follows: 
𝑧𝑖
0 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑖
2 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑛𝑖
2 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑦1,𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑦2,𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐸𝑓𝑖 (2.4) 
where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛼4, 𝛼5 and 𝛼6 are the parameters to be estimated and they are constant across all 
buildings. 𝑇𝑎 represents air temperature, 𝐵𝑛 represents direct radiation, and 𝐷𝑦1  and 𝐷𝑦2  are dummy 
variables representing the energy standard. They are (-0.5, 1) for the Standard 90.1-2007, (-0.5,-0.5) for the 
Standard 90.1-2010 and (1,-0.5) for the Standard 90.1-2013. 𝐸𝑓  represents the grid emission factor 
(gCO2/Btu). 
The emissions of the prototype office building 𝑧𝑖
0  are estimated in fourteen climatically consistent 
regions within the contiguous United States based on the International Energy Conservation Code. For 
each region, one city was selected to represent the climatic conditions of that region. The climate data of 
each city are collected from Meteonorm 7, which gathers hourly data on climate factors such as global 
radiation, direct radiation, temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind, etc. By plotting the emissions with 
respect to the climate data, it is determined that air temperature and direct radiation have a significant effect 
on building emissions. As evidenced from Figure 2.2, the impact of air temperature on emissions is 
quadratic. This quadratic relationship is due to the increases in energy consumption in summer and winter 
months because of the need to use air conditioners and heaters (Buzoianu et al., 2005). The deterministic 
variables are 𝑇𝑎𝑖
2 and 𝑇𝑎𝑖, where 𝑇𝑎𝑖 denotes air temperature. It is further noted that emissions linearly 
correlate with the square of direct radiation, and thus the deterministic variable 𝐵𝑛𝑖
2 is adopted, where 𝐵𝑛𝑖 





Figure 2.2  Change of Building Emissions with Air Temperature 
 
Electricity in the selected cities is often supplied by different power grids that vary in fuel 
structures and in their generation and distribution efficiencies. Such situations lead to significant 
divergences in grid emission factors (gCO2e/Btu) among cities. In other words, buildings that 
consume the same amount of energy may emit different amounts of carbon dioxide based on the power 
grids in which the buildings are located. Therefore, the grid emission factor (𝐸𝑓𝑖 ) is selected as a 
deterministic variable of building emissions. The value of the emissions factor is obtained from the Climate 
Registry (TCR, 2015). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the estimated coefficient values of building emissions in Equation 2.4. 
Building emissions are significantly affected by climate conditions (air temperature 𝑇𝑎 and direct radiation 
𝐵𝑛), the energy standard with which the building complies (𝐷𝑦1 and 𝐷𝑦2) and the grid emission factor 
(𝐸𝑓). On average, compared to the Standard 90.1-2007, emission savings are 230 gCO2/ft
2 for the Standard 
90.1-2013 and 52 gCO2/ft








Table 2.1 Regression Result for Building Emission 
Coefficient Value Standard deviation P-value 
𝛼1 1.044 0.400 0.000 
𝛼2 -21.923 0.900 0.000 
𝛼3 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
𝛼4 -118.482 9.826 0.000 
𝛼5 34.919 9.647 0.000 
𝛼6 3449.389 142.440 0.000 
Constant 84.481 25.838 0.001 
Note: Number of observation is 528. F(6,521)=291.58.  
R-squared is 0.7705. Adjusted R-squared is 0.7679. 
 
Equation 2.4 is used to predict future emissions of the prototype building in a changing climate. The 
future climate data are provided by Meteonorm 7 and are based on General Circulation Models. The 
models combine with different emission scenarios presented in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: 
Climate Change 2007. The emission scenarios include A1FI, A1B, A1T, A2, B1 and B2. None of the 
emission scenarios represent a best guess of future climate change. The A2 scenario, which is used in this 
study, is characterized by a world of independently operating and self-reliant nations with continuously 
increasing populations and regionally oriented economic development (IPCC, 2000). This scenario 
represents a sustained increase in global emissions and includes the highest increase in temperature to 
occur by 2100 (Robert and Kummert, 2012). With temperature increase of approximately 0.4° Celsius in 
this scenario, the baseline emission of the prototype building is expected to increase by 4.4% from 2010 to 
2030, as presented in Figure 2.3. The building constructed with the most stringent energy standard (90.1-




situation may occur when the buildings are located in different climatic zones. The lower bound in Figure 
2.3 represents the emissions of the most energy efficient building following a corresponding energy 
standard, and thus, it is often a building located in a region that has a mild climate and an efficient power 
grid. Conversely, the upper bound often represents the emissions of a building located in a region that has 
extreme cold or hot weather and a less efficient power grid. 
 
Figure 2.3  Prediction of Baseline Emissions for Different Energy Standards 
 
2.3.3 Emission reduction techniques 
Conventional ways of reducing emission often include the change of insulation materials and windows. 
Building emission is affected by the R-values of insulation materials, which differ in the type of material 
used and the thickness on both roof decks and walls. The R-values of wall insulation range from 10 to 15. 
The cavity R-values and continuous R-values of roof insulation range from 13 to 49 and from 15 to 25, 
respectively. Windows are altered in four ways: (i) number of panes, (ii) gas fill, (iii) tint, and (iv) low 
emission control. The U-values of the windows range from 0.17 to 0.76. The solar heat gain control 
(SHGC) values of the windows range from 0.26 to 0.67. Daylight control technique is also included. 
Conventional windows will be replaced with view and daylight windows as recommended by the Small to 
Medium Office AEDG Recommendations. Windows on the south facade will have exterior shading or light 
























internal shading controls. Daylight sensors are added in spaces with daylight control. 
The prototypical building is designed with the alternative technologies of three wall insulation materials, 
five roof insulation materials and five windows, and daylight control. A total of 38 design alternatives are 
generated. Each of those designs adopts one or multiple emission reduction technologies. The designs are 
used in different climatic zones and their emissions are estimated using the OpenStudio Parametric Analysis 
Tool (PAT). Not all the designs are effective in any climatic zones. For example, the daylight control technique 
can save 41.8 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑓𝑡2 per year when it is used in Miami (zone 1A), while it increases the energy use by 
40.9 𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑓𝑡2 per year when it is used in Chicago (zone 5A). The main reason for this difference is that the 
use of daylight windows in Chicago significantly increases the heating load in winter. Energy used for 
heating far exceeds the lighting savings. Given that, the technologies that are not effective in a particular 
region are removed from the analysis of that region. Figure 2.4 summarizes the mitigation potential with 
the use of aforementioned technologies in different climatic zones. The technologies are generally more 
effective in cold regions (e.g., zones 5 to 7) than they are in mild or hot regions (e.g., zones 1 to 3). 
 
 





2.4 Estimation of Abatement Costs and Revenues 
Empirical data are collected to estimate building retrofit costs ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) and initial construction costs 
𝑖𝑐(𝑥) and to determine parameter values for life cycle payoffs, e.g., 𝛾𝑡 and 𝛽. 
2.4.1 Building retrofit cost 
The building retrofit cost is described as a function of emission reduction and climate condition, as 
expressed in Equation 2.5. The retrofit cost is estimated using the cost analysis module of OpenStudio 
PAT. The technology cost parameters are obtained from the National Residential Efficiency Measures 
Database. It is implicitly assumed that the cost of insulation materials and windows are not significantly 
different between residential buildings and commercial buildings. The emission reduction has been 
estimated in Section 2.3.2. The climatic zones are grouped according to the differences in temperature 
and humidity. Temperature difference is denoted by 𝑇𝑒. 𝑇𝑒 is 1 for zones 1 to 4 and 2 for zones 5 to 
7. Humidity difference is denoted by Hu. Hu is 1 for the zones with the letter A (dry) and 2 for the 
zones with the letter B (moist) or C (marine). 
ℂ(𝑞) = 𝛽1𝑞
2 + 𝛽2𝑞
2 ∙ 𝑇𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑞
2 ∙ 𝐻𝑢 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 (2.5) 
where 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are the parameters to be estimated and they are constant across all buildings. ℂ(∙) 




· yr), Te represents the climatic zones differentiated by temperature, Hu represents the 
climatic zones differentiated by humidity. The regression results in Table 2.2 indicate that the cost is a 
convex function of the emission reduction, which is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level.  
 
Table 2.2  Regression result for Building Retrofit Cost 
Coefficient Value Standard deviation P-value 
𝛽1 1.86×10





-3 1.14×10-5 0.000 
𝛽3 0.658 0.214 0.002 
Constant 3.704 0.589 0.000 
Note: Number of observation is 281. F (3,277) = 49.59.  
R-squared is 0.3494. Adjusted R-squared is 0.3424. 
It is emphasized that in practice, each project-based baseline should be monitored and verified by 
a standard organization and that there are additional fees applied to these processes compared to using a 
performance baseline. Normally, each project experiences two rounds of external reviews with average 
expenses of $5,000 per round. Therefore, the abatement cost is increased by $10,000 per project when 
implementing the project-based baseline. 
2.4.2 Initial construction cost 
The incremental costs for initial construction are estimated by PNNL(2013) and PNNL(2015). The 
studies analyze national cost-effectiveness of ASHRAE 90.1-2010 and 90.1-2013 compared to ASHRAE 
90.1-2007. The cost estimates are tied to the changes in HVAC system, lighting, building envelope, power 
and other equipment. As the retrofit is limited to the building envelope in this study, only the cost 
associated with building envelope is considered. Table 2.3 displays the incremental initial costs of the 
changes in energy standard from ASHRAE 90.1-2007 to 90.1-2010 and 90.1-2013, respectively. 
 
Table 2.3  Incremental Cost Estimate (unit: $/sq.ft) 
Climate zone 90.1-2007 90.1-2010 90.1-2013 
1~3 0 0.42 0.61 
4 0 1.29 4.08 





2.4.3 Life-cycle payoffs 
The life-cycle analysis approach is based on the method used by the Federal Energy Management 
Program (PNNL, 2015). The method applied in this case consists of determining the payoffs from emission 
abatement, the year in which they occur, and their values in present dollars. Future payoffs are discounted 
to the present value based on a discount rate. The discount rate often reflects the interest that could be 
earned on another conventional investment with similar risk. The real discount rate of 3% used in this study 
is based on Rushing et al. (2013). Thus, β = 1/(1 + 3%) = 0.97. 
This chapter uses a  30-year study period, the same study period used for the cost-effectiveness 
analysis of the commercial energy code conducted by the PNNL (2015). The study period is a balance 
between capturing the impact of future inflation, energy and carbon price escalation and the increasing 
uncertainty of these factors in the future. Because technologies can be adopted anytime during the 30-
year study period, the residual of the unused life is not negligible for the technology that is adopted later. 
Thus, it is inappropriate to define the terminal value as zero at the end of the study period. This study 
assumed that the payoffs continue to be discounted at β after the end of the 30th year. Therefore, the terminal 
value is 𝜋𝑖,𝑡=30/(1 − 𝛽). 
Electricity prices by state were obtained from EIA Monthly Electric Power Report 2015 (EIA, 2016). 
The escalation rate was estimated based on the price percentage change from 2014 to 2015. The price of 
voluntary carbon offset was obtained from Carbon Catalog at http://www.carboncatalog.org (access in 
October, 2015); a publicly available directory that contains the price information of 40 U.S. offset 
providers. Their average offset price is $5 per metric ton, which is used as the initial price in this study. 
The increasing rate is assumed to be $1 per year. A t ransaction fee is assumed to be 2% of the revenues 




2.5 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Program participation and mitigation decisions 
The optimal problem is specified by plugging empirical function (Eq. 4 and 5) into objective functions 
(Eq. 1 and 2). A closed-form solution for the dynamic problem is derived in t he  Appendix. The model 
is then run in a dynamic pattern using AnyLogic 7.1.2 for two scenarios. The first is a scenario for new 
construction projects, where the project proponents first choose an energy standard for building 
construction (according to Eq.1) and then decide on the annual emission reductions during the operation 
phase (according to Eq.2). The second is a scenario for building retrofit projects, where the project 
proponents take building designs as given and decide on the annual emission reductions during the 
operation phase. In each scenario, two baseline rules are compared with respect to their effects on emission 
mitigation, cap extension and profit generation. 
With respect to new construction projects, the construction and operation phases contribute differently 
to emissions mitigation over a building’s life cycle. As displayed in Table 2.4, 9.6% of emission mitigation 
occurs in the construction phase due to optimally selected energy standards, while 91.4% of emission 
mitigation occurs in the operation phase through subsequent retrofit. ASHRAE 90.1-2013 is the optimal 
choice for 80% of the buildings with the project-based baseline and 64% of the buildings with the 
performance baseline. Even if more than half of the buildings follow the most cost-effective energy 
standard, subsequent retrofits are still likely to be profitable as energy and carbon prices are expected to 
increase. Compared to the project-based baseline, adopting the performance baseline enables the project 
proponents to earn $4.64/ft2 more from carbon trading at the expense of generating 13.3 kg/ft2 non-
additional offsets. The performance baseline can increase private profits mainly because it eliminates the 
need for verifying individual project baselines and saves the costs associated with project application, 
monitoring and verification. Considering the current carbon price, the monetary gains from using the 




With respect to retrofit projects, buildings have been constructed following current commercial building 
energy codes in their corresponding states. According to the statistics of the U.S. Department of Energy, as 
of April 2016, 10% of the states have adopted ASHRAE 90.1-2013 or higher, 34% have adopted 
ASHRAE 90.1-2010 and 56% have adopted ASHRAE 90.1-2007 or lower. Accordingly, their as-built 
energy performances are lower than those for the new construction projects, for which 64% have optimally 
chosen to adopt ASHRAE 90.1-2013. As the adoption of energy codes are differentiated for existing 
buildings, the variances in BAU emissions over geographic regions are more obvious. These variances 
lead the use of a performance baseline to produce more non-additional offsets even though the emission 
mitigation remains roughly the same as that for new construction projects. 
 









New construction  
(cons./oper.) 
Project-based  2.25/21.16 0/0 1.79/0.12 
Performance  1.97/21.28 -0.84/13.88 2.30/4.25 
Retrofit projects 
(operation only) 
Project-based  20.67 0 0.12 
Performance  21.01 20.95 5.93 
 
2.5.2 Baseline effects on offset allocation 
Not every project proponent benefits from using the performance baseline. As a threshold 
uniformly applied to the whole sector, a performance baseline is theoretically certain to over-allocates 
offsets to some emitters and under-allocates offsets to others. This problem is extremely prominent in the 
building sector as emissions significantly vary according to geographic regions. Figure 2.5(a) displays 
the percentage of sold offsets of the total emissions over a building’s life cycle. In climatic zone 6B 




even though the actual reduction only accounts for 23% of the total. This finding is observed primarily 
because the buildings located in this climatic zone have BAU emissions that are far below the performance 
baseline. The difference between the BAU emissions and the baseline can guarantee a great deal of non-
additional offsets even without any further emission mitigation. In contrast, buildings in climatic zones 
such as 1A, 2A, 2B and 3A, due to their high BAU emissions, are not qualified to earn offsets even though 
they have voluntarily reduced their emissions by approximately 10%. This allocation bias prevents high 
BAU emitters from participating and leads to a trading program that consists solely of low BAU emitters. 
The offset allocation problem does not exist with the  project-based baseline because it generates 
the offsets in accordance with individual emission reductions. Using this baseline greatly increases the 
participation rate because every unit of emission reduction is qualified to be traded as an offset. By 
comparing the offset sale percentages using different baseline rules (Figure 2.5 (a) vs. (b)), it is evident 
that more areas are willing to participate when using the project-based baseline than when using the 
performance baseline. For example, buildings located in zones 1A, 2A and 4A, which opt-out under the 
performance baseline, are qualified to sell offsets under the project-based baseline, with the amount 
equivalent to approximately 5% to 10% of their emissions. In addition, using the project-based baseline can 
avoid generating non-additional offsets, assuming the baseline is perfectly designed. For each individual 
building, the amount of offsets reflects its actual emission reductions. The offsets, therefore, are 
dispersed over different geographic regions as opposed to being highly concentrated in certain regions under 





(a) Performance Baseline 
 
(b) Project-based Baseline 
Figure 2.5  Percentage of Sold offsets on Total Building Emissions 
 
2.5.3 The paradox of baselines adjusted for co-benefits 
As suggested by the dynamic model solution in the Appendix, annual emission reductions are driven by 
the expected revenues from both offset sales and utility savings. This implies that utility savings may 




profitable portion of emission reduction, in theory, should not be claimed as carbon offsets. However, 
neither of the baseline approaches have taken this into account, which may lead to an overestimation of 
the offsets. The extent to which the emission reduction is driven by utility savings depends on the relative 
price of electricity to carbon dioxide. Based on the current average offset price, i.e., $5 per metric ton 
of carbon dioxide, the real offsets only account for approximately 3% of the actual emission reductions. 
Even at the end of the study period, when the offset price increases to $35, the effective offsets are 
only approximately 16% of the actual emission reductions. This means, if the baselines are adjusted to 
exclude all the self-profitable emission reductions, most of the previously qualified offsets will become 
non-additional and the voluntary trading will become a dispensable mechanism for the building sector. 
The baselines that are thoroughly adjusted for profitability are not politically feasible in many cases 
because profitability is not the only factor that determines technology implementation in practice. Many 
mitigation technologies are commercially available and cost-effective, but they are often not fully 
implemented due to market barriers and policy constraints (Liu et al., 2013). The barriers include, but 
are  not limited to, information asymmetries, bounded rationality, a lack of access to capital, burdensome 
transaction costs, institutional resistance to change current practices, etc. Significant economic incentives 
are often needed to enable the technologies to achieve what is expected. The incentives can be provided 
by baselines that are slightly more generous than their theoretical values, thus accounting for those hard-
to-quantify barriers in the market. 
2.5.4 Relaxing perfect information 
The previous analysis considered the case where the regulator has perfect information of BAU emissions, and as such, 
the baselines can be set without any biases. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, some degree of information asymmetry is 
to be expected. At the least, the regulator may know the general trend and distribution of BAU emissions over different 
geographic regions but is unlikely to have accurate emissions information for each individual building. The assumption 
of perfect information always fails in practice. This section, therefore, relaxes the assumption through allowing 




triangular distributions and are assigned with the most likely values as well as upper and lower bounds. Specific assigned 






















Performance baseline Percentile 80th 90th 50th 
Project-based baseline Times of BAU emission 1 0.8 1.2 




Increase of electricity price $/year 0.14 -0.1 0.5 
 
Allowing for imperfect information about the performance baseline does not significantly change the 
overall mitigation decisions. As the baseline fluctuates around the unbiased 80th percentile, over- and under-
allocation in different years can compensate each other to some extent. The total non-additional offsets 
with imperfect information increase by 32.6% compared with the case with perfect information. The 
increased non-additional offsets drive up the private profit from $4.25/ft2 to $10.14/ft2. As presented in 
Figure 2.6(a), even though the amplitude of the baseline remains roughly the same, annual non-additional 
offsets decrease over time. This phenomenon can be explained by a diminishing difference of emissions from 
buildings across the country. As high emitters continuously optimize their emissions, they gradually narrow 
the emission gaps among different geographic regions. The population’s emissions then become more 
homogeneous over time. Such a population has a small emission variance and thus produces less non-
additional offsets with the performance baseline. 
The imperfect information case, however, fundamentally changes the results of using the project-based 
baseline. The project-based baseline does not produce any non-additional offsets with perfect information. 
However, if the assumption is relaxed, non-additional offsets are generated when the baselines are positively 
deviated from the BAU emissions. As the temperature continues to rise in future, as presented in Figure 
2.6(b), the amount of non-additional offsets sharply increases over time. As a result, the life cycle non-
additional offsets amount to 22.8 kg/ft2, thus exceeding the total of 18.4 kg/ft2 with the performance 
baseline. This implies that the effect of the project-based baseline on emission mitigation is extremely 
sensitive to information accuracy and validity, and accordingly, the problem of non-additionality is easily 





(a) Performance Baseline 
 
 
(b) Project-based Baseline 
Figure 2.6  Baseline Effects with Imperfect Information 
 
2.6 Summary 




carbon trading. A project-based baseline, in principle, is capable of providing effective incentives for 
emission mitigation and is strict in environmental integrity. However, the baseline’s feasibility is 
conditional on the ability of an accurate prediction of BAU emissions. The results indicate that at least for 
the commercial building sector, the uncertainty in predicting BAU emissions can lead to a great deal of 
non-additional offsets generated by the voluntary program and selling the non-additional offsets to the 
compliance programs can result in one of the following consequences. If the compliance entities are not 
able to tighten their own emission caps in response, which is mostly likely to occur in practice, there will 
be a net increase of global emissions by approximately 53 million metric tons per year. If the compliance 
entities are tightened, increased emissions can be prevented but the payment for non-additional offsets will 
exceed $1 billion per year. These results assume the offsets include the self-profitable reductions due to 
utility savings. To the extent that these savings are treated to be non-additional, the potential for the project-
based baseline may be even bleaker than suggested in this study. 
The performance baseline, in contrast, is more adaptive to the uncertainty of the BAU emission prediction 
as the total amount of non-additional offsets does not significantly increase due to the allowance of 
imperfect information. The performance baseline also reveals a decreasing trend as the emission 
differences among individuals diminish over time. This is an obvious advantage because the inability to 
make precise predictions about building emissions, particularly over a 30-year time horizon, is to be 
expected. Even using an advanced energy demand model can err by up to 35% (Yu et al., 2010). In addition, 
the performance baseline streamlines the verification process by eliminating the need for project 
proponents to verify their individual project baselines. This characteristic further reduces transaction 
costs of emission mitigation and renders the performance baseline more attractive compared to the project-
based baseline. 
One of the concerns of the performance baseline is the inequity in offset allocation and a lower 
program participation rate. As a uniform emission threshold applied to the whole sector, the performance 




The results presented in this chapter suggest that buildings in certain climate zones, due to their low 
BAU emissions, can obtain offsets four times more than their actual emission reductions, whereas many 
high BAU emitters opt out of the program even if they voluntarily reduce emissions. This allocation issue 
does not exist in a program with the project-based baseline because projects are awarded offsets against 
their self-customized baselines. One way to address the allocation issue is to propose multiple performance 
baselines stratified according to geographic characteristics. However, as this solution significantly increases 
the sample size requirements to form representative distributions for different geographic regions, it is costly 
to implement in practice. 
The issue of baseline selection may also exist in other sectors. Even in those believed more transparent 
and data-rich, such as the power generating sector, emission prediction errors range from 0.48% to 11.32% 
depending on coal characteristics (Roy et al., 2009). As demonstrated by Winebrake and Sakva (2006), 
seemingly small errors in total energy forecasts actually hide more significant errors in specific sectors. In 
the U.S., the energy prediction conducted by the Energy Information Administration can err by as much as 
3.55% for the residential building sector, 6.08% for the industrial sector and 11.09% for the transportation 
sector over a ten-year time horizon. While this chapter only demonstrates the results for the commercial 
building sector, similar attention should be given to the issue of baseline feasibility for other sectors. 
As the project-based baseline has been widely used for mitigation projects, regulators are advised to be 
cautious regarding the prediction errors of their BAU emissions and implement the baseline while updating 
on the conservative side. For the projects that want to adopt the project-based baseline for future crediting, 
it is suggested that qualifications are evaluated based on the project nature and that permits are issued only 
to the projects whose emissions are relatively easy to predict. The performance baseline is more suitable 
to those sectors that have a complicated emission mechanism. Finally, regulators are advised to be cautious 




Chapter 3 Baseline Manipulation in Voluntary Carbon Offset Programs 
Abstract 
Studies of voluntary carbon trading almost exclusively assume the additionality baselines are set by 
regulators who have either perfect or imperfect information about the costs and emissions of projects. In 
practice, regulators are often less informed than project proponents; therefore, the baselines are more likely 
to be privately defined even for sectoral crediting. The primary concern with privately defined baselines is 
that baseline developers may exert their powers to manipulate the baselines, leading to increases in sectoral 
emission caps. This study models baseline manipulation behaviors in the context of adverse selection, 
where participants can self-select into the market. The theoretical results show that the extent to which the 
baseline is manipulated is highly dependent on who is assigned as the baseline developer. The more the 
baseline developer emits, the more likely the developer manipulates the baseline. The results are further 
discussed in the context of the U.S. commercial building sector, where empirical methods are introduced 
to characterize cost and revenue functions. The empirical analysis reveals that, because of the notably low 
price elasticity of the offset supply, baselines are often positively biased even with third-party verifications. 
The biased baselines would produce up to 852 gram of non-additional offsets per square feet of building 
space and result in approximately 700 million metric tons of carbon leakage in compliance programs each 
year.   
3.1 Introduction 
Carbon offset is an intangible asset. The value of this asset is recognized through an additionality test 
that attempts to distinguish with a price signal the projects that achieve real carbon reduction from the 
projects that would have been undertaken anyway in the absence of the signal (UNFCCC, 2012). Only the 
projects that would not have occurred under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario are considered additional. 




find it costly to reduce emissions. The additionality test is thus the centerpiece of carbon offset programs 
to ensure overall environmental integrity. 
The additionality test is performed by setting a baseline against which the emission reduction is 
quantified. Setting the baseline requires rather detailed information about typical project practices over a 
wide range of sectors. Such information is usually privately owned and less accessible to the regulators. As 
one of the regulators, Verified Carbon Standard helped fill this information gap by engaging the efforts of 
industrial associations and private firms that are well placed to determine baselines for their own sectors 
(VCS, 2012). The privately defined baselines therefore served as thresholds for any projects within that 
sector to test additionality. 
The main concern with the baselines is that the private firms, as baseline developers, may exert their 
power to manipulate the baselines and thus gain more from the offset programs. For example, baseline 
developers may lower the baseline to expel competitors from the offset programs. The decrease in offset 
supply drives up the offset prices, which creates more surpluses for the developers but risks forgoing the 
benefits of cost-effective offset projects. It is also possible that the developers increase the baseline above 
the counterfactual BAU emission, allowing themselves to sell non-additional offsets. The non-additional 
offsets either represent a damage cost due to global warming or an increase in the transaction costs within 
this sector. Even though such manipulation is reduced to some extent by third-party verifications, it plays a 
role in the programs that reward offsets based on additionality (Jack, 2008). 
In the offset programs where participation is voluntary, the baseline manipulation relies not only on 
monopoly rents but also on complex incentives for other firms in the programs; they are potential 
participants. Because the participants have more information about their own abatement costs than the 
baseline developer, they can decide to participate if they are offered a favorable baseline (Fischer, 2005). 
This so-called adverse selection problem has been widely studied in the context of voluntary emission 
trading. Previous studies in this area focused on the impact of asymmetric information on the baseline 




and Montero (1999, 2000) show that a generous baseline promotes participation but produces a large 
volume of non-additional offsets. These offsets result in significant social losses even with the consideration 
of abatement cost savings. However, the study of van Benthem and Kerr (2010) shows that a stringent 
assigned baseline may also reduce market efficiency because participants will self-select into the program. 
While the issue of adverse selection has spurred considerable discussion in the voluntary opt-in programs, 
its impact on the sector-wide baselines has yet to be studied in the context of market distortion induced by 
unregulated exercise of manipulation. 
This chapter focuses on the motivation for manipulating baselines and its impact on the reduction of 
global emissions. The hypothesis is that baseline developers can always gain more by deviating from the 
unbiased baseline, which is an emission threshold that surpasses the 80th percentile of comparable peers 
(UNFCCC, 2006). The analysis is performed in three steps:  (i) a firm’s abatement decision is modeled as 
a response to the sectoral additionality baseline. Observing the baseline, self-informed firms decide whether 
to participate and how much to reduce their emissions.  Each firm’s emission reduction is a function of the 
baseline, as depicted on the left side of Figure 3.1. (ii) One of the firms in the program is chosen to be the 
baseline developer who solves an optimization problem in the context of adverse selection. The developer 
takes firm’s response functions as given and uses them to set the baseline that maximizes its expected 
payoffs, as depicted on the right side of Figure 3.1. (iii) The functional forms are specified in the context 
of the U.S. commercial building sector. Closed-form solutions for the optimal baseline are derived, which 


























Figure 3.1 Framework of the adverse selection problem 
 
3.2 Model Setup 
3.2.1 Participation and abatement decision 
The model proposed in this study is similar in the spirit to that of Millard-Ball (2013), who developed 
an adverse selection model in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism. There are firms i = 1 ,…, 
N that may choose to participate in an offset program. The firms are voluntary participants that do not face 
emission caps from compliance programs. For simplicity, I assume that, given an offset price and an 
additionality baseline, the firms make one-time decisions about the amount of emission reduction 
simultaneously. 
Emission reduction brings two potential payoffs to the firms. The first is the revenue from selling carbon 
offsets to either the entities regulated in the compliance program or the individuals in the voluntary program. 
The second is the utility savings reflecting reduced energy consumption, which is proportional to the 




Each firm i has an annual BAU emission 𝑧𝑖
0 ∈ 𝑅+. If the firm chooses to reduce emissions by 𝑞𝑖 ∈ 𝑅+, 
it needs to make a one-time investment ℂ(𝑞𝑖; 𝑧𝑖
0), 𝑅+ → 𝑅+ for technology upgrades and obtain annual 
revenue ℝ(𝑞𝑖; 𝑧𝑖
0), 𝑅+ → 𝑅+ from the reduced energy usage. The ultimate emission of the firm i is 𝑧𝑖 =
𝑧𝑖
0 − 𝑞𝑖. Otherwise, the firm’s emission remains 𝑧𝑖
0, and its abatement cost is zero. All firms are faced with 
a uniform baseline 𝑏 ∈ 𝑅+ set by a baseline developer. The difference between 𝑧𝑖 and b can be sold as 
offset at price 𝑝 = ℙ(𝑏), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑅+. The annual revenue from the offset sale is 𝑝(𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
0 + 𝑞𝑖). It is assumed 
that firm i estimates its BAU emission 𝑧𝑖
0 and cost function ℂ(𝑞𝑖; 𝑧𝑖
0) with certainty. It can observe but not 
affect, the offset price p and the baseline b. A risk-neutral firm will decide to participate if and only if the 
gain, which is the combined offset sale and utility saving, outweighs the cost. Mathematically, net profit 
should satisfy 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑖{𝜃[𝑝(𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
0 + 𝑞𝑖) + ℝ(𝑞𝑖)] − ℂ(𝑞𝑖)} ≥ 0 (3.1) 
 
where 𝜃 = [(1 + 𝑎)𝑛 − 1]/[𝑎(1 + 𝑎)𝑛] represents a conversion of an n-year uniform annual revenue to a 
present value at interest a. It is a positive constant number. 
Assuming each firm is a profit maximizer, the optimal reduction 𝑞𝑖
∗ should be reached when the marginal 
revenue (the sum of offset sale and utility saving per unit of emission reduction) equals marginal cost ( the 




∗. Not all firms supply offsets. Only the firms whose optimal ultimate emissions 𝑧𝑖
∗ are less than the 
baseline will participate in the program and supply carbon offsets. The offset supplies from such firms are 
𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
∗. The firms with ultimate emissions higher than the baseline supply zero offset to the program. 






𝑠 = 𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖






3.2.2 Baseline setting 
Any firm in the program could be the firm that sets the baseline. Because of technology differences and 
information asymmetry, some firms may have higher probabilities of becoming the baseline developer. 
There will be a game in which the firms compete for the developer position. For simplicity, instead of 
solving this game, the baseline developer is assumed to be given, for example, firm 1, with BAU emission 
𝑧1
0. 
To apply the baseline to the entire sector, the developer needs to pay a fixed cost 𝑓 ∈ 𝑅+ to the standard 
organization to get the baseline verified. In return, the developer gets compensated in terms of collecting a 
certain fee for any unit of offset sold based on the baseline. This fee is denoted as 𝜏 ∈ (?̅?, 𝜏) ∈ 𝑅+. Assuming 
offset demand always exceeds supply, the total compensation is ℍ(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = 𝜃𝜏𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗) − 𝑓 . The 
developer also benefits from its own offset sale and utility saving. 
In contrast to the other firms that choose 𝑞𝑖 and take b as given, the baseline developer determines both 
𝑏 and 𝑞1 simultaneously. In this problem, b is used to affect the offset price p, which, in turn, affects the 
participation of the other firms. As one example, a more stringent b reduces the annual supply of offsets 
𝑠 = 𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗). A decrease in supply drives up the offset price p according to the inverse supply curve 
𝑝 = ℙ(𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗)), 𝑅+ → 𝑅+. For the developer, the increased price contributes to its revenue from offset 
sale but reduces its compensation because of decreased offset supply (s). Therefore, the goal of the 
developer is to choose both 𝑏 and 𝑞1that can achieve the overall maximum profit that combines its own 






∗) = argmax{𝑏, 𝑞1| 𝜃ℙ(𝑏)(𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
0 + 𝑞1) + ℍ(𝑏) + ℝ(𝑞1)] − ℂ(𝑞𝑖)} (3.3) 
  
Given 𝑞1
∗, the baseline developer sets the baseline 𝑏∗ by weighing the trade-offs between its own offset 
sale and the compensation as a baseline developer (ℍ(𝑏)). Any deviations from the optimal baseline 𝑏∗ 
will result in a loss of expected profit. Graphically, this is demonstrated in Figure 3.2. If the baseline 
developer sets 𝑏 = 𝑏∗ − ∆𝑏, a total of 𝑁∆𝑏 emission reductions are not regarded as offsets anymore, and 
the annual supply of offset decreases, which, in turn, causes the offset price to increase by ∆𝑝. The change 
in the profit will be the extra offset sale (area A) minus the cost of non-additional reductions (area B). 
Meanwhile, the baseline developer receives less compensation because of the decrease in offset sales (here, 
all the offsets are assumed to be sold). The loss of compensation is the compensation fee (τ) times the 
change of offset sale (∆𝑠 = 𝑠∗ − 𝑠), represented by area C. Because 𝑏∗ maximizes the total expected profit, 
the impact of deviation (area A-B-C) must be negative. 
 




3.2.3 Baseline adjustment under verification 
The privately defined baseline must be assessed and validated by independent verification bodies. The 
objective of the verification is to ensure that the baseline level provides both environmental integrity and 
sufficient financial incentive to potential projects. Therefore, in practice the optimal baseline 𝑏∗ solved in 
Section 3.2.2 may not be the optimal value. It may requires some adjustments to account for the need for 
third-party verifications. 
Carbon emissions are “fugitive events” that are not recorded by any party other than the emitter itself. 
They are not similar to conventional air pollutants that can be directly measured by monitoring devices. 
The verification bodies can only indirectly estimate the honesty of the baseline through the underlying data 
and dataset that are submitted by the baseline developer. Because of this limited monitoring ability, the 
possibly imperfect verification is characterized by the conditional probabilities (Malik, 1993). 
 
ω𝑗 = P( 𝑏 at level j passes verification | 𝑏 > 𝑏
0) (3.4) 
 
where ω𝑗 represents the probability that the privately defined baseline b at level j can be verified even if it 
is higher than the unbiased baseline 𝑏0  (𝑏 < 𝑏0  is allowed in verification because of the principle of 




1,… ,𝑁)}. The value of ω𝑗 changes linearly between 0 and 1. 
If the baseline b does not pass the verification, the baseline developer needs to revise the baseline level 
and resubmit it for another round of review. The cost of resubmission is assumed to be the same as the 
verification fee 𝑓. The developer is allowed to revise the baseline infinite times until it is eventually verified. 
Because each round of revisions is associated with a cost f, it is more cost effective for the developer to 
only adjust the baseline once if necessary. A risk-neutral baseline developer will adjust the level of the 





𝑏∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑏| 𝜋𝑎𝑑, 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑎𝑑} (3.5) 
𝜋𝑎𝑑 = 𝜔𝑏𝑎∗ ∙ 𝜋1
𝑎 + (1 − 𝜔𝑏𝑎∗)(𝜋1
0 − 𝑓) (3.6) 
𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝜔𝑏∗ ∙ 𝜋1 + (1 − 𝜔𝑏∗)(𝜋1
𝑎 − 𝑓) (3.7) 
 
where 𝑏∗  represents the optimal baseline level under verification. The payoff is 𝜋𝑎𝑑  if the baseline 
developer decides to adjust the baseline from 𝑏∗ to 𝑏𝑎∗ . The payoff is 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑎𝑑  if the baseline developer 
decides not to adjust the baseline and directly submits the baseline 𝑏∗ for verification. 
The value of 𝑏𝑎∗ is determined through Monte Carlo simulation. The baseline developer begins with the 
baseline level 𝑏∗ that is solved in Section 3.2.2. Submitting the baseline 𝑏∗ has the probability (1 − 𝜔𝑏∗) 
that it is detected to be biased. If it is detected, the baseline developer will lower the baseline level until it 
passes the verification. The highest baseline level that passes the verification is recorded as 𝑏𝑎. This process 
is simulated 5,000 times. Each simulation outputs a 𝑏𝑎, and the value of 𝑏𝑎∗ is the average of all of the 𝑏𝑎s. 
The payoff of setting the baseline to be 𝑏𝑎∗ is denoted as 𝜋1
𝑎.  
The choice of b may have a positive or negative spillover effects on the net reduction of global emissions 
𝔾(𝑏). 𝔾(𝑏) takes into account both the reduced emissions from participating firms and the increased 
emissions from the offset buyers, mostly the ones regulated in compliance programs. 𝔾(𝑏) is the difference 
between the actual emission reductions and the offset supply, expressed in Equation 8. 𝔾(𝑏) < 0 suggests 
that there is a net increase of global emissions and that the offset program is considered to be ineffective. 
𝔾(𝑏) = ∑𝑞𝑖





3.3 Empirical Estimates of Function Forms 
The functions defined in Section 3.2 are specified in this section to derive closed-form solutions. The 




sector is chosen as an example. This sector is one of the pilot sectors that have implemented the additionality 
baseline in the United States.  
3.3.1 Cost and revenue functions of emission abatement 
The cost and revenue functions of emission abatement include one-time technology investment 
ℂ(𝑞𝑖; 𝑧𝑖
0) and annual utility saving ℝ(𝑞𝑖). The functions are constructed according to the outputs from the 
Open Studio Parametric Analysis Tool (PAT).  The relevant data are collected in the following way: (i) 
Typical energy conservation measures are selected from the Open Studio Building Component Library and 
downloaded into the PAT;  (ii) technological cost data are collected from the National Residential Efficiency 
Measures Database; (iii) medium-sized office prototype buildings are created using the Open Studio 
Energy Plus module and imported into the PAT, along with their cost and climate data; and (iv) the energy 
performances of the prototype buildings are simulated in the PAT to obtain data on the energy savings and 
corresponding technology costs. The data reveal a quadratic relationship between emission reductions (𝑞𝑖) 
and technology costs (ℂ(𝑞𝑖)); thus, ℂ(𝑞𝑖) is expressed as a quadratic function of 𝑞𝑖 in Equation 3.9. 
The annual utility saving ℝ(𝑞𝑖) is linear with respect to energy saving. Energy savings often convert 
proportionally to emission savings through a constant emission factor, i.e., 0.093 kg CO2 per MJ electricity. 
Thus, ℝ(𝑞𝑖) is defined as a linear function of 𝑞𝑖 in Equation 3.10. 
ℂ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜂𝑞𝑖
2, 𝜂 > 0 (3.9) 
ℝ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝛾𝑞𝑖, 𝛾 > 0 (3.10) 
where 𝜂 and 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated. 𝜂 > 0 given that technology costs are positive and often 
increase with the emission reductions,  𝛾 > 0, as it represents utility saving for one unit of emission 
reduction. 
3.3.2 Carbon offset price-supply curve 
The impact of supply on offset price is estimated based on the data from the Carbon Catalog at 




contains the price information from 40 offset providers. Their annual offset supplies range from 50,686 
tons to 154,303,000 tons. The offset providers with annual supplies less than 50,000 tons are excluded 
because most of them only have one offset project, which makes the prices depend highly on the nature of 
the project and fluctuate frequently. The only two offset providers with annual supplies larger than 
400,000,000 tons are also excluded because the offset prices of these two providers are internally 
inconsistent, and often different from project to project. Among the providers recorded in the dataset, the 
reporting years range from 2007 to 2015. The CPI Inflation Calculator provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics is used to convert the dollar values in different years to the year 2015. 
 
(a) Changes in offset prices with the offset supply 
 
(b) Changes in offset prices with provider locations 





























































Unlike regulated programs where price can be clearly predicted, voluntary programs display a wider 
range of price characteristics, which makes the price mechanism less clear. One explanation is that the 
offset price in the voluntary program may reflect not only the relationship between marginal cost and 
marginal benefit but also preference for associated co-benefits such as favorable public reputation (Conte, 
2010). This characteristic is partially reflected in an unclear price-supply relationship, as shown in Figure 
3.3. Nevertheless, the data still reveal a general trend that the offset prices decrease with the offset supply. 
In addition, the data reveal the differences between providers located in Europe or Australia and those 
located in America. For mathematical convenience, the change in the offset price is assumed to be linear 
with respect to the changes in the offset supply, as expressed in Equation 3.11. (Section 3.5.1 shows that 
the linear relationship is statistically significant).  
 
𝑝 = 𝑣1𝑠 + 𝑣2𝑅𝑒        , 𝑣1 < 0 (3.11) 
 
where 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 are the parameters to be estimated and are constant across all buildings. p is the carbon 
offset price. s is the annual offset supply. Re is a dummy variable representing the region where the provider 
is located: 1 for Europe or Australia and 0 for America. 
3.4 Participation and Baseline Setting Results 
Firm participation problems are solved by plugging empirical Equations 3.9 and 3.10 into the objective 



















With a given distribution of initial emission 𝑧𝑖
0 , firms tend to reduce more when the offset price 
increases. The offset price is an exogenous variable to firms but an endogenous variable to the baseline 
developer. The baseline developer cannot directly set the offset price, but it can affect the price by changing 
the annual offset supply. Recall that the annual offset supply is  
𝑠 = 𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = ∑ max (𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
∗, 0)𝑁𝑖=1 . Because this function has sharp corners, the feasible zone of this 
function is divided into two intervals, which are discussed separately. 
 
• Interval 1: 𝑏 ≥ 𝑧
∗
 - all the firms participate in the program 
If baseline 𝑏 ≥ 𝑧
∗
= max{𝑧𝑖
∗, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁}, all of the firms can sell at least some offsets. They supply 
offsets with the amount 𝕊𝐼(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = ∑ (𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
∗)𝑁𝑖=1 . Thus, the supply function becomes continuously 
differentiable.  
In this context, the baseline developer solves b and 𝑞1  simultaneously according to Equation 3.3. 




























0= initial emission of the baseline developer 
𝜃 = a factor that convert a uniform annual revenue to a present value 
𝜏 = compensation fee 





𝜂 = a parameter in Equation 3.9 showing the change of technology costs with emission reductions 
𝜈1= a parameter in Equation 3.11 showing the change of offset price with offset supply 
C = an expression referred to Appendix Equation B4 
D = an expression referred to Appendix Equation B4. 
 
Equation 3.14 indicates that the baseline developer determines the baseline 𝑏𝐼∗  based on its initial 
emission level 𝑧1
0, the price elasticity of offset supply 𝜈1, and its compensation fee 𝜏. A low emission 
baseline developer tends to set a stringent baseline. The baseline will be more stringent in the program 
where either the offset price is more responsive to the supply changes (large |𝜈1|), or the compensation fee 
is low (small  ). 
• Interval 2: 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 𝑧
∗
 − a proportion of firms participate in the program 
If baseline 𝑏 < 𝑧
∗
= max {𝑧𝑖
∗, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁}, at least some firms choose to opt out and supply zero offsets. 
In this case, for mathematical convenience, the total supply of offsets is represented by 𝕊𝐼𝐼(𝑏) =
(𝑏/𝑏𝐼∗)𝕊𝐼(𝑏𝐼∗) . The expression of 𝕊𝐼(𝑏𝐼∗)  can be found in Appendix Equation B9. This function 
approximates the change in the offset supply with the baseline level. When the baseline 𝑏 is equal to 𝑏𝐼∗, the 
offset supply is the same as that for Interval 1. Because 𝑏 is more stringent in Interval 2, the offset supply 
decreases as more firms opt out. Once 𝑏 becomes zero, all of the firms opt out, and the offset supply 
decreases to zero. 
The baseline developer uses the function of offset supply 𝕊𝐼𝐼(𝑏) and solves the same problem that it 
solves for Interval 1. The results of 𝑏𝐼𝐼∗ and 𝑞1
∗ are presented in Equations 3.16 and 3.17 (refer to the 
Appendix B for the detailed calculation process). 𝑏𝐼𝐼∗ displays similar properties to 𝑏𝐼∗, that is, decreasing 





















(𝑋𝑏𝐼𝐼∗ + 𝑌 + 𝛾)                 , 𝜂, 𝜃, 𝛾 > 0 (3.17) 
where 
𝑧1
0= initial emission of the baseline developer 
𝜃 = a factor that converts a uniform annual revenue to a present value 
𝜏 = compensation fee 
𝛾 = utility saving for one unit of emission reduction 
𝜂 = a parameter in Equation 3.9 showing the change of technology costs with emission reductions 
𝜈1= a parameter in Equation 3.11 showing the change of offset price with offset supply 
X = an expression referred to Appendix Equation B11 
Y = an expression referred to Appendix Equation B11. 
 
The baseline developer chooses 𝑏∗ ∈ (𝑏𝐼∗, 𝑏𝐼𝐼∗) that brings greater payoffs, satisfying Equation 3.3. The 
choice of 𝑏∗ has a spillover effect on the net reduction of global emissions 𝔾(𝑏∗) according to Equation 
3.8. 𝔾(𝑏II∗) ≥ 𝔾(𝑏I∗) given that 𝑏𝐼∗ ≥ 𝑏𝐼𝐼∗. This means that if 𝔾(𝑏I∗) > 0, so is 𝔾(𝑏II∗). The expression 





















) , 𝜏 > 0, 𝜈1 < 0 (3.18) 
 
Equation 3.18 shows that given a fixed number of firms (N), 𝔾(𝑏𝐼∗) positively correlates with the price 
elasticity of the offset supply (|𝜈1 |) but negatively correlates with the compensation fee (τ).  More 
importantly, this equation highlights the significance of answering a question, namely, who should be the 




the global emissions, highly depends on the relative emission level of the baseline developer in the program, 





0 (the first term of Equation 3.18 is simplified here given that 𝜃𝐶 is 
very small). The more the baseline developer emits, the more likely the developer sets a baseline that results 
in a net increase in global emissions (𝔾(𝑏I∗) < 0). When the baseline developer behaves in this way, the 
offset trade will produce negative environmental externalities on a global scale. 
3.5 Case Study 
3.5.1 Parameter estimation 
The theoretical results in Section 3.3.4 are applied to the U.S. commercial building sector, which 
constitutes approximately one third of the national carbon emissions. OpenStudio is used to create prototype 
buildings and estimate their annual carbon emissions. A total of 48 prototype buildings are created 
according to the ASHRAE 90.1-2013 Standard and placed in fifteen climatically consistent regions based 
on the International Energy Conservation Code. For each region, one city is selected to represent the climate 
conditions of that region. The climate data for each city are collected from Meteonorm 7 and used as input 
data for Open Studio Energy Plus to estimate the hourly emission of each building. All of the buildings are 
three-floor office buildings with 53,660 ft2. Their emissions range from 1,240 gCO2e/ft2 to 8,851 gCO2e/ft2, 
depending on the climate regions in which they are located.  
Building retrofit cost is described as a function of emission reduction in Equation 3.9. The retrofit cost 
is estimated using the cost analysis module of OpenStudio PAT. The technology cost parameters are 
obtained from the National Residential Efficiency Measures Database. It is implicitly assumed that the costs 
of abatement technologies are not significantly different between residential and commercial buildings. The 
regression result shows that the relationship between retrofit cost (ℂ(q)) and the square of emission 
reduction (𝑞2) is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The coefficient η is 4.50×10-6 (P-value 




Utility saving is described as a function of emission reduction in Equation 3.10. Because electricity is a 
major energy source for buildings, electricity saving is used to approximate utility saving from emission 
abatement. The electricity price for each climate region is obtained from EIA(2016) and ranges from 7.8 
cent/kWh to 17.8 cent/kWh. The electricity emission factor for each climate region is obtained from 
TCR(2015) and ranges from 1,001 lbs/MWh to 1,896 lbs/MWh. The electricity saving per unit of emission 
reduction (γ) is therefore estimated to be from $1.17×10-4 to $3.16×10-4 per gram of emission reduction. 
The carbon offset price is described as a function of the offset supply in Equation 3.11. The parameter 
estimation is presented in Table 3.1. On average, each gram increase in offset supply drives down the carbon 
offset price by $6.99×10-9. The relationship is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, with R-
squared 0.2106.   
 
Table 3.1 Regression result for carbon offset price 
Coefficient Value Standard deviation P-value 
𝜈1 -6.99 × 10
-9 3.26 × 10-9 0.039 
𝜈2 5.69 × 10
-6 2.36 × 10-6 0.021 
Constant 1.73 × 10-5 2.13 × 10-6 0.000 
Note: The number of observation is 40. F (2, 37) = 4.93 
R-squared is 0.2106. Adjusted R-squared is 0.1679. 
3.5.2 Result analysis 
In this case study, one of the 48 building owners is selected as the baseline developer. The developer 
solves for the optimal baseline and emission reductions according to the equations in Section 3.3.4, where 
the parameters are set according to Section 3.5.1. As shown in Figure 3.4, the optimal baseline varies with 
the initial emission of the baseline developer. The developers who own the buildings with higher emissions 
tend to set the baseline at a higher level. This trend implies that the level of baseline manipulation depends 





Figure 3.4 Comparison of manipulated baselines with unbiased baselines 
 
Compared with the unbiased baseline, privately defined baselines often deviate positively and produce 
more carbon offsets. The unbiased baseline shown as the dotted line in Figure 3.4 represents the 80th 
percentile threshold of all building BAU emissions. This threshold follows the spirit of UNFCCC (2006) 
that requires the baseline to surpass the 80th percentile of comparable peers. Depending on the initial 
emission of the baseline developer, privately defined baselines deviate from the unbiased baseline to 
different extents. With the exception of the extremely low emissions case, the baseline developer is more 
likely to increase the baseline level and enjoy extra revenue from selling non-additional carbon offsets. This 
inclination can be explained by the very low price elasticity of the offset supply, which means that a 
significant increase in the offset supply will not substantially reduce the revenue from selling a unit of 
carbon offset. This low price elasticity motivates the baseline developer to increase the baseline level to 
benefit from larger offset supply in the program. 
Even with third-party verifications, the baseline developer still tends to deviate from the unbiased 
baseline. As presented in Figure 3.4, although the acts of manipulation can be restricted to some extent by 
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developer because, for high emitters, the gains from manipulated baselines outweigh the losses from being 
detected and revising the baseline level. These emitters are more willing to take the risk of submitting 
dishonest baselines during the first round review. Because the probability of being detected increases with 
the degree of baseline deviation, monitoring is generally more effective in restricting the manipulation 
behaviors of high emitters compared to low emitters. 
The direct impact of baseline increases is producing more non-additional carbon offsets from the 
program. Once these offsets are sold to the entities regulated by compliance programs, the emission caps 
are implicitly extended, resulting in an increase in global emissions. As shown in Figure 3.5, if the baseline 
is unbiased, the offset trading in this case can, on average, reduce global emission by 771 gCO2e/ft2. 
However, if the baseline is allowed to be privately defined, it is highly likely to be manipulated to produce 
large amounts of non-additional offsets, even exceeding the reduced emissions from firms participating in 
the program. Even with third-party verification, the manipulation can still result in a net increase in global 
emissions as high as 852 gCO2e/ft2. Considering a total of 87 billion square feet of floor space for 
commercial buildings in the United States, the emission caps in the compliance programs will be extended 
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Figure 3.5  Comparison of global emission reductions between using unbiased and manipulated baselines 
3.6 Summary 
The issue of additionality baselines is studied in the context of adverse selection, where firms self-select 
to participate in carbon offset programs. One of the firms is assigned as a baseline developer who takes 
firms’ strategies as given and decides on the baseline that is applied to all of the firms in the program. 
Because the baseline is privately defined, it represents a level that maximizes the expected benefit of the 
baseline developer instead of our long-believed social welfare maximum. Such a privately defined baseline 
is suspected to run a risk of extending sectoral emission caps and resulting in a net increase of global 
emissions. 
My theoretical results show that the extent to which the baseline is manipulated highly depends on who 
is assigned to be the baseline developer. The more the baseline developer emits, the more likely the 
developer exerts its power to manipulate the baseline. The result is further discussed in the context of the 
U.S. commercial building sector, where the empirical methods are introduced to characterize the cost and 
revenue functions. The empirical analysis reveals that, because of the notably low price elasticity of the 
offset supply, the privately defined baseline is often positively deviated and produces more non-additional 
carbon offsets.  
To the extent that policymakers wish to allow baselines to be privately defined, they might be advised 
to focus on the firms that emit less than their peers in the sector. This implies that an “open to all” policy 
might not be the most plausible option. Instead, baseline setting might be implemented on an invitation-
only basis to specific emitters that have relatively lower historical emissions. In the case studied here, 
inviting the firms whose emission performances are among the top 20% of comparable peers as the baseline 
developers can enable the offset program to achieve a net reduction of global emissions. 
In practice, the consequence of the privately defined baseline is restricted due to third-party verification. 
Any proposed baseline should be reviewed by independent verification bodies not involved in monitoring 




Nevertheless, any verification body needs to address the necessary trade-offs between cost and uncertainty, 
especially when faced with multiple small emission sources, e.g., single buildings. The allowance for 
uncertainty leaves the baseline developer with a chance to benefit from a manipulated baseline. This study 
indicates that even with the third-party verification, the baseline developer still has strong motivation to 
deviate from the unbiased baseline and produce non-additional carbon offsets. Once the offsets are sold to 
the entities regulated by compliance programs, the emission caps are implicitly extended, which can result 
in approximately seven 700 metric tons of carbon leakage each year. Therefore, it is pivotal for regulators 




Chapter 4 Balancing Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Goals: Decision Making 
on Building Retrofits in Hurricane-Prone Regions 
Abstract 
Increased climate risks pose challenges of combining climate mitigation and adaptation goals into 
building designs. These two goals are often misaligned, as adaptation measures use additional materials 
and equipment that are sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This phenomenon causes building 
design to involve tradeoffs between enhancing structural resilience and reducing GHG emissions. This 
chapter addresses the need to identify the optimal investment allocation mechanisms between climate 
mitigation and adaptation measures for the design of buildings in hurricane-prone regions. A dynamic 
decision-making model is developed for individual investors to maximize their expected payoffs over a 
building’s lifecycle. The model is based on the evaluation of non-stationarity hurricane damages and 
building emission performance under different mitigation scenarios. The results reveal a transition from 
long-advocated low-carbon investments to risk-oriented portfolios for building retrofits. The value of 
enhancing structural resilience is demonstrated through a case study on Anne Arundel County, MD, for 
which a “60-40” resilience/abatement portfolio is recommended. It is suggested that risk mitigation efforts 
should be supported with discretion on the accuracy of insurance premium discounts. Meanwhile, subsidies 
for emission abatements are recommended to accommodate existing emission trading schemes and building 
property values.  
4.1 Introduction 
Historically, climate policies on sustainable buildings have almost exclusively focused on greenhouse 
gas (GHG) mitigation (Aldy, 2015). Emissions trading schemes have been formed as climate policy 
instruments at national and regional levels to control global warming by creating economic incentives for 




where projects can achieve stable revenues in the presence of carbon price signals; however, they are 
suspected to be less attractive in areas at substantial risk of experiencing catastrophic events such as 
hurricanes and floods (Guikema, 2009). These events damage local buildings and result in significant direct 
costs such as restoration and indirect costs such as losses of business revenue and economic growth in 
impacted areas. To balance future costs of structural failures, project proponents have been advised to pay 
extra up-front costs to enhance structural resilience and to prepare, absorb, recover from and adapt to natural 
disasters (Linkov, 2014). 
Much of the early work on resilient buildings focused on the design of single buildings with an emphasis 
on soil-foundation-structure-building envelope systems to improve performance in disasters (e.g., for a new 
development to be built in a hurricane-prone area) (Ellingwood et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2005; Li & 
Ellingwood, 2006; Van de Lindt & Dao, 2009). Traditional design practices involve slab-on-grade 
construction, which is susceptible to hurricanes. A new modular building system that involves the use of 
precast concrete elements combined with light-frame wood sub-systems (including basements) is proposed. 
This modular system reduces risks of hurricane damage by providing a stiffer living area through the 
addition of precast concrete elements and by providing occupants shelter in the basement (Chang, 2009). 
Resilience studies have recently been extended to a focus on the performance of building networks 
(Filippini & Silva, 2014; Chopra & Khanna, 2015; Rochas et al., 2015). Relevant studies have sought to 
optimize the performance of building networks exposed to a spectrum of natural disasters that can be 
matched to community resilience goals. They thus consider resilient building networks as a necessary 
component of resilient communities.  
With several exceptions, enhancing structural resilience inevitably aggravates global warming, as it not 
only requires additional construction materials and installation activities, but it also tightens budgets for 
emission abatements. Strengthening costs, depending on construction specifications and the availability of 
materials, range from 5% to 10% of the total property value (Li, 2012). This cost makes project proponents 




insulation, daylight control, window upgrades, etc. Meanwhile, additional construction materials and 
activities are required to improve building element capacities to withstand natural disasters. For example, 
more resilient buildings are now constructed on modified, elevated foundations, and materials are stronger 
and more resistant to mold and hurricane straps (Guikema, 2009). These retrofitted elements emit GHGs 
throughout their production, transportation and installation and thus become additional emission sources 
that are not a factor in non-retrofit cases (Li et al., 2007).   
Therefore, ways of properly addressing climate risks depend on investment decisions that trade off, at 
least implicitly, emission abatement (slowing down global warming) for resilience management (adapting 
to global warming). As a traditional solution, adopting emission abatement measures can reduce energy 
costs and generate revenues from carbon offset sales. Kneifel (2010) showed that these measures can be 
used to limit energy use in new commercial buildings by 20-30% on average. Life-cycle costs can be 
reduced by 3% on average and by up to over 6% for some building types and locations. However, these 
revenue sources can be interrupted due to structural failures resulting from disasters, rendering abatement 
investments less attractive. As global temperatures continue to increase and as more areas are subjected to 
severe natural disasters, the vast majority of property and wealth is now at risk of significant damages. 
UNISDR (2012) reported that the annual loss induced by infrastructure failures amounted to roughly $55 
billion in the United States. This number is expected to increase due to the combined effects of climate 
change and increased coastal inventories of assets (Ayyub et al., 2012). These expected damages highlight 
the need to enhance resilience to sustain building operation and to accelerate post-disaster recovery. 
According to ULI (2015) studies on the South Florida Resort, the use of hurricane resilience measures can 
lower annual expected damages by an estimated $500,000, thus significantly reducing annual operation 
expenses. This makes resilience management an important addition to traditional low-carbon development 
pathways, and if it is properly managed in conjunction with emission abatements, it will lead to a more 




This chapter attempts to identify optimal investment allocation between climate mitigation and 
adaptation measures for the design of buildings in hurricane-prone regions. A dynamic decision-making 
model is developed for individual investors to maximize their expected payoffs over a building’s lifecycle. 
The model is based upon an evaluation of non-stationarity hurricane damages and building emission 
performance under different mitigation scenarios. Optimal investment allocation is determined by 
characterizing individual investment behaviors on emission abatements, hurricane mitigation, and 
interactions between these two actions. This chapter supports the following outcomes: (i) the development 
of a hybridized decision model that facilitates a balance between resilience and sustainability objectives, 
(ii) the ability to reflect resilience goals in building design, construction and maintenance, and (iii) the 
model’s application to a selected county to demonstrate its capacity to manage a broad range of building 
cases and to determine policy implications for a county’s environmental and economic sustainability. 
4.2 Model  
4.2.1 Overview 
As discussed above, climate mitigation and adaptation are two approaches available to project 
proponents in the design of sustainable buildings. Climate mitigation is often achieved by implementing 
energy-efficient technologies to reduce electricity and natural gas use during building operation. Climate 
adaptation is often achieved by reinforcing a building’s structure, allowing it to better defend against future 
catastrophic events such as hurricanes. Both approaches involve additional up-front technology investment 
while also offering financial benefits owing to reduced expenditures dedicated to energy usage and 
structural restoration.  
The use of emission abatement measures generates financial benefits mainly through voluntary carbon 
trading markets. Markets enforce emission thresholds for individual buildings that are referred to as 
additionality baselines. Differences between baselines and actual building emissions are qualified to be 




among projects and offset providers. Revenues from carbon offset sales are earned on an annual basis and 
often last over remaining building years.    
The use of adaptation measures strengthens building structures and helps reduce property damages 
during catastrophic events. Catastrophic events induced by climate change can include hurricanes, floods, 
earthquakes, etc. This study restricts attention to hurricanes for illustration purposes. The probability and 
intensity of hurricane winds is expected to increase in a changing climate. Using hurricane mitigation 
measures in buildings can reduce the chances and severity of damages, thus reducing expenditures on 
restoration. Expected cost savings are dependent on many factors such as building values, hurricane 
intensity levels, damage severity levels, and recovery periods. This information is assumed to be known by 
individual project proponents amidst some uncertainty surrounding hurricane occurrence. 
In this context, the goal of a project proponent is to maximize expected payoffs by determining 
investment allocation between emission abatement and hurricane mitigation. As shown in Figure 4.1, each 
project proponent is modeled as a forward-looking decision maker. He is a potential participant in voluntary 
carbon trading markets and has perfect information on any technologies that are applicable to his building 
to reduce energy consumption or enhance structural strength. Restricted by a fixed annual budget, he aims 
to allocate the budget on different measures to achieve maximum lifecycle payoffs. He is given the right to 
adjust allocation practices on an annual basis as he continues to observe changes in market environments 
and climate risks. Each project proponent makes decisions independently and the performance of one 
building has no effect on the performance of another building during hurricane events. The results of this 
model exhibit dynamic investment allocation between emission abatement and hurricane mitigation 







Figure 4.1 Diagram of model framework 
 
4.2.2 Model setup 
Project proponents, designated as i = 1,…, N, design, construct and operate buildings. Each building 
has initial emissions 𝑧𝑖,0 and expected annual damages 𝑀𝑖,0 due to hurricane risks. For a business-as-usual 
(BAU) case, at year 𝑡 = 1, a building’s emissions are designated as 𝑧𝑖,1 = 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝜖𝑖,1 and expected annual 
damages are designated as 𝑀𝑖,1 , where 𝜖𝑖,1  reflects BAU emission adjustments due to an external 
environment change from t = 0 to t = 1. Such changes follow the same pattern for remaining building years. 
For any year 𝑡, the building can be retrofitted in two ways. The first involves improving energy 
efficiency levels and reducing GHG emissions. At 𝑡 = 1, if the building reduces 𝑟𝑖,1 > 0, it emits 𝑧𝑖,1 =
𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑟𝑖,1 + 𝜖𝑖,1 , saves utility bills 𝑦𝑖,1 = 𝕐(𝑟𝑖,1)  and incurs an abatement cost 𝑐𝑖,1 = ℂ(𝑟𝑖,1) . 𝑧𝑖,1  is 
compared against an additionality baseline 𝑏1, and only emissions below 𝑏1 can be sold as offsets at an 
exogenous price p1. Revenues from carbon sales are 𝑝1(𝑏1 − 𝑧𝑖,1). At t = 2, the building is faced with a new 
carbon price p2 and determines whether emissions must be reduced further. If emissions are not reduced further, 
the abatement cost remains at 𝑐𝑖,1 and emissions are 𝑧𝑖,2 = 𝑧𝑖,1 + 𝜖𝑖,2. Otherwise, the building reduces 



















𝑦𝑖,2 = 𝕐(𝑞𝑖,2) and abatement costs are 𝑐𝑖,2 = ℂ(𝑞𝑖,2). Emissions are thus reduced to 𝑧𝑖,2 = 𝑧𝑖,1 − 𝑞𝑖,2 +
𝜖𝑖,2. Similar decisions will be made each year until the building reaches its end of life.  
The second retrofit plan involves reinforcing the building’s structure and reducing future hurricane 
damages. At 𝑡 = 1, if 𝑎𝑖,1 is invested in the building to install hurricane mitigation measures, the expected 
annual damage is reduced from 𝑚𝑖,0 = 𝑀𝑖,0  to 𝑚𝑖,1 = 𝑀𝑖,1 ∙ 𝔸(𝑎𝑖,1) , where 𝔸(𝑎𝑖,1)  represents the 
percentage of building damages that can be avoided due to investments 𝑎𝑖,1. At t = 2, the building is faced 
with an increase in hurricane risks and whether additional mitigation measures must be adopted is 
determined. If there no further investments are made, the mitigation cost remains at 𝑎𝑖,1 and the expected 
annual damage is 𝑚𝑖,2 = 𝑀𝑖,2 ∙ 𝔸(𝑎𝑖,1). Otherwise, 𝑎𝑖,2 is invested in the building and the cumulative 
investment becomes 𝑘𝑖,2 = 𝑎𝑖,1 + 𝑎𝑖,2. The expected annual damage is reduced to 𝑚𝑖,2 = 𝑀𝑖,2 ∙ 𝔸(𝑘𝑖,2). 
Similar decisions will be made each year until the building reaches its end of life.  
The annual retrofit investment is bounded by 𝐹𝑡, implying that 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑡. In this context, 
a  risk-neutral project proponent will maximize life cycle payoffs by balancing investment between emission 




Π𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽Π𝑖,𝑡+1 
𝒔. 𝒕.   𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
         𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
   𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑡 
(4.1) 
 
The additionality baseline (𝑏𝑡 ) is a sector-wide emission threshold that is uniformly applied to all 
buildings without considering individual differences. The United Nations Framework Convention on 




surpasses the 80th percentile of comparable peers (UNFCCC, 2006). Comparable peers include project 
activities undertaken in the previous five years in similar social, economic, environmental and technological 
contexts. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed herein that all buildings examined in this study are 
comparable peers and therefore comprise the bundle for the baseline. It is also assumed that initial emissions 
(𝑧𝑖,0)  follow a normal distribution with a mean (𝑧0̅)
 and standard deviation (σ). Given this, the baseline is 
𝑧0̅ − 0.84σ  and is adjusted for external environment change (𝜖𝑖,𝑡 )  as expressed in Equation 4.2. This 
represents the 80th percentile threshold for all BAU emissions. 
 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑧0̅ − 0.84𝜎 + ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (4.2) 
4.3 Structural Resilience Evaluation 
The expected annual damage (𝑚𝑖,𝑡) is an important model input that represents a building’s ability to 
adapt to future hurricane risks. This ability is often referred to a building’s resilience and can be quantified 
using a resilience metric. This section presents a practical resilience metric that allows one to track building 
structural performance over time. The value of resilience is calculated based on a probabilistic method that 
describes a non-stationary Poisson process of hurricane occurrence. This method also involves determining 
the value of 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 to solve for optimal investment allocation in Equation 4.1. 
4.3.1 Resilience metric  
Several reputable entities have focused on defining the notion of resilience for infrastructure and on the 
development of resilience metrics. The National Research Council for instance defined resilience as the 
ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or potential 
adverse events (NRC, 2013). This concept can be illustrated through a resilience triangle as shown in Figure 




levels of functionality are achieved. The percentage of functionality loss versus the area of full performance 
is used as a measure of infrastructure resilience (Ayyub, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 4.2  Diagram of the resilience triangle with basic assumptions 
 
The resilience metric described in this chapter is consistent with practical metrics proposed by Ayyub 
(2015) that simplifies complicated system performance during disasters while maintaining intent, 
comprehensiveness and accuracy. The following assumptions are made: (i) the functionality of a building 
is sustained without any aging effects until a hurricane occurs; (ii) building failure is brittle; (iii) after a 
hurricane, a building recovers to previous performance levels; (iv) the recovery pattern is linear; (v) 
hurricane occurrence follows a Poisson point process with a mean occurrence rate (𝜆𝑡); (vi) the planning 
horizon relates to the initial mean occurrence rate as 𝑡 = 1/𝜆0; and (vii) building failures are independent.  
The resilience metric is defined as the ratio of a building’s residual value after failure to its counterfactual 
value without any incidents. More specifically, the ratio is the rectangular area (𝑉0 ∙ 𝑡𝑟) subtracted from the 
triangular area (0.5(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖)(𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟)) over the rectangular area (𝑉0 ∙ 𝑡𝑟). It is expressed in Equation 4.3 for 
(i) functionality is 
sustained











(v) Poisson process to 
a hurricane
(vi) planning horizon 
t = 1/λ0 






























a single failure-inducing hurricane event. Methods for determining building value (𝑉0) and extended time 
(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖) are explained in Appendix C (Chock, 2005).  
𝑅𝑓 = 1 −
0.5(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖)(𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟)
𝑉0 ∙ 𝑡𝑟
 (4.3) 
4.3.2 Hurricane damage evaluation 
In the resilience metric, the loss of building value (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟)  is determined by hurricane damage 
evaluation. Hurricane hazard is often expressed through wind speed probability for a standard average time, 
exposure and elevation (Li et al., 2016). The wind speed cited in this chapter refers to 1 min sustained wind 
speed denoted as 𝑣. According to Georgiou (1986), the maximum wind speed achieved during a hurricane 
can be effectively modeled by a Weibull distribution. The cumulative density function (CDF) of wind speed 
is described in Equation 4.4. A non-stationary hurricane wind process is used to characterize the time 
variance of storm intensities due to climate change. The two Weibull parameters 𝑢𝑡 and 𝛼𝑡 in Equation 4.4 
are treated as functions of time.  
 







As no evidence has been presented to describe future changing patterns of hurricane winds, it is assumed 
that the mean speed increases linearly with time while the coefficient of variation remains unchanged 
(Bjarnadottir et al., 2011). Assuming that 𝑟𝑢 is the annual increment rate in parameter 𝑢𝑡, corresponding 
Weibull parameters are described as follows. 
 
 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢0 + 𝑟𝑢𝑡 (4.5) 




Based on Huang et al. (2001) and Li et al. (2016), expected annual damages caused by hurricanes (𝑀𝑖,𝑡) 
are derived and presented in Equation 4.7 (refer to Appendix D for detailed information). ℎ(𝑥, 𝑡) is the 
probability of the damage ratio exceeding a threshold 𝑥. 










The use of hurricane mitigation measures can reduce expected annual damages (𝑀𝑖,𝑡) and the expected 
loss of building value (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟) during hurricane events. Mitigation measures are categorized depending on 
the building component they improve. These include (i) roofing, (ii) decking, (iii) roof-to-wall connections, 
(iv) opening protection, and (v) water resistance. The costs of these measures are estimated by Pinelli et al. 
(2009) as applied to typical timber and masonry buildings of different ages and construction quality levels. 
Cost data are presented in Table 4.1 in terms of replacement cost ratios, which are defined as costs of 
replacing a particular component or assembly divided by the cost of constructing an entire building.  
 














Improved decking nailing 




Clip/strap/lumber plate 4.1% 10% 




protection Laminated/impact glasses 
Security film 
Water resistance Joint sealing / taping 1.7% 4% 
Data sources: Torkian et al. (2014), Pinelli et al. (2009), and FDEM (2005) 
As hurricane events are inherently uncertain, the effects of such measures on building value preservation 
can be neither directly observed nor accurately estimated by engineering professionals. Hurricane insurance 
data for buildings can be used to infer the cost savings of using mitigation measures. In theory, the expected 
loss in building value due to hurricanes should be equal to the premium paid for hurricane insurance 
policies. Thus, any premium discount offered to mitigation measures should represent the expected cost 
savings associated with hurricane events. Let 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 denote the premium discount. In turn, through the use of 
mitigation measures, adjusted annual building damages (𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ) should be BAU annual damages (M𝑖,𝑡 ) 
discounted at 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 as expressed in Equation 4.8.  
Different mitigation measures are offered with different discounts depending on their effectiveness at 
reducing hurricane hazards. The discount data shown in Table 4.1 serve as an example of Florida’s 
insurance policies. Other states also use premium discount policies, but discounts employed are not 
disclosed to the public. As indicated by the data shown in Table 4.1, the change in premium discounts 
offered to insured buildings (𝑑𝑖,𝑡) is linearly correlated with the change in the replacement cost ratio (𝜌𝑖,𝑡). 
This suggests that a change in the premium discount should also be linearly correlated with a change in 
mitigation investments (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) given that construction costs are constant. Thus, 𝑑𝑖,𝑡  is determined from 
Equation 4.9, where 𝜔 is a constant coefficient representing this linear relationship. 
 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝔸(𝑘𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) (4.8) 





4.4 Emission Abatement Evaluation  
Cost and revenue functions of emission abatement include one-time technology investments 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 =
ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) and annual utility savings 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ℝ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡). Ideally, these variables should be estimated for individual 
buildings, as buildings always respond differently to adopted technologies. To develop an analytical model 
for a general case, costs are assumed to depend only on building types and on emission reductions, and 
revenues are assumed to depend only on energy savings. Numerical relationships are estimated through 
Energy Plus simulations supported by the OpenStudio. A detailed description of the estimation process is 
presented in Section 3.3.1. The data reveal a quadratic relationship between emission reductions (𝑞𝑖,𝑡) and 
technology costs (ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡)), and thus ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) is expressed as a quadratic function of 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 in Equation 4.10. 
Annual utility savings ℝ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) are linear with respect to energy savings. Energy savings are often 
proportionally converted to emissions savings through a constant emission factor, i.e., 0.093 kg CO2 per 
MJ electricity. Thus, ℝ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) is defined as a linear function of 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 in Equation 4.11. 
 






𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ℝ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾𝑞𝑖,𝑡 (4.11) 
 
where 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated, and these parameters are constant across all buildings. 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡  represents retrofit costs in $/sq.ft; 𝑞𝑖,𝑡  represents the cumulative annual emission reduction in 
gCO2e/(sq.ft
 
· yr); and 𝐷𝑦𝑘  are dummy variables representing building types (e.g., office, school, 
restaurant, hospital, hotel, etc.). 
We employ a  30-year study period, which is the same study period used in the cost-effectiveness 
analysis of the commercial energy code conducted by the PNNL (2015). The study period captures impacts 




with these factors in the future. As technologies can be adopted any time over the 30-year study period, the 
residual of the unused life is not negligible for the technology that is adopted later on. Thus, it is assumed 
that payoffs continue to be discounted at β after the end of the 30th year. The terminal value is Π𝑖,𝑡=30/(1 −
𝛽). The values of key modeling parameters are described in Section 2.4.3. 
4.5 Case Study 
The analytical model employed is described in the above sections for a general case. Closed-form 
solutions for annual emission reduction (𝑟𝑖,𝑡) and mitigation investment (𝑎𝑖,𝑡) are derived in Appendix E. 
In this section, the analytical results are applied to Anne Arundel County, Maryland to demonstrate the 
model’s applicability in guiding regional climate action plans. Numerical simulations are performed to 
illustrate how project investment, participation and outcomes vary with respect to the occurrence of 
hurricane winds in this county.  
Historical hurricane data for Anne Arundel County were obtained from the U.S. National Hurricane 
Center (http://coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes). Over a radius of 50 miles, a total of 25 hurricanes directly 
affected this county from 1861 to 2008. On average, 0.174 hurricanes occurred annually over this period. 
The hurricane season runs from the beginning of June through the end of October. The most active months 
are August and September, which account for 60% of all hurricanes occurring in this county. 
Building energy consumption data were provided by the Anne Arundel county government. The data 
include annual electricity and natural gas usage levels for 76 commercial buildings for 2008 to 2014. These 
buildings include administrative offices, warehouses, courthouses, fire departments, public libraries, road 
operation buildings, senior centers, etc. Based on the building typologies provided by the U.S. Department 
of Energy, they can be categorized into: i) 66 small offices including buildings with floor spaces of less 
than 50,000 square feet, ii) 9 medium-sized offices including buildings with floor spaces of between 50,000 
to 200,000 square feet, and iii) 1 warehouse. The average annual electricity usage levels for the above three 




0.3, 0.6 and 0.3 thm/sq.ft, respectively. The modeling parameter values for this county are described in SI-
F. 
4.5.1 Results of dynamic investment in resilience 
Optimal investment allocations are estimated for a total of 76 commercial buildings in Anne Arundel 
County for a period of 30 years. As indicated by Figure 4.3(a), project proponents invested more in 
structural resilience when faced with an increase in hurricane hazards over time. Investment in resilience 
increases from 62.6% to 66.4% over the 30-year period. In the initial year, 31 buildings invest more than 
70% of their retrofit budgets into structural resilience. This number increases to 43 by the end of the 30th 
year. This increasing trend suggests that reinforcing building structures can deliver more payoffs than pure 
emission abatements. Traditional retrofit plans emphasize energy conservation that reduces life-cycle costs 
and GHG emissions. These plans are less cost-effective when buildings are subject to structural damages 
induced by climate hazards. Instead, investment portfolios that balance trade-offs between emission 
abatement and hazard mitigation can generate higher payoffs in the long run. In general practice, a “60-40” 
resilience/abatement portfolio could be recommended without access to any detailed building information. 
Optimal resilience/abatement portfolios change with building characteristics. They are often reflected 
in differences in property values. As shown in Figure 4.3(b), project proponents of buildings with higher 
property values invested more in structural resilience than those of buildings with lower property values. 
For example, in the initial year, investment in resilience reached 80.9% for buildings worth more than 
$200/sq.ft, while this portion is only 21.3% for buildings worth less than $50/sq.ft. This trend underscores 
the importance of customizing investment portfolios according to property values. High-valued buildings 
suffer from more serious economic losses when their structures are damaged, requiring more up-front 
investments in structural resilience to preserve property values. Structural damages constitute the main 
driver behind optimal portfolio differences among buildings, as payoffs from investing in emission 




individual buildings, optimal resilience/abatement portfolios could reach as high as “80-20” or as low as 




(a) Change in resilience investment percentages 
 
 
(b) Relationship between building value and resilience 
investment percentage 
(c) Map of the studied buildings and of their resilience 
investment values by the end of 30th year 
  
Figure 4.3  Optimal investment portfolios for building retrofits in Anne Arundel County 
 
The occurrence of hurricane winds significantly affects optimal portfolios and property damages in the 
county. As indicated by Figure 4.4, in the BAU case, where the expected 1 min sustained wind speed is 
22.4 m/s with a mean occurrence rate of 0.17, the total expected property damage level is 3.99 million 












































abatement can achieve a reduction of 6,290 metric tons of GHGs. The average resilience metric is 99.52%, 
meaning that 0.48% of the property values are expected to be lost due to hurricane winds occurring in the 
coming 30 years. If the expected wind speed increases over this period (e.g., the speed increases by 5 m/s 
from the 10th year), investment in resilience will increase to 72.1%. The total expected property damage 
level will increase to 5.13 million dollars while the total emission abatement level will decrease to 5,861 
metric tons of GHGs. In turn, average resilience metric becomes 99.38%, meaning that an extra 0.14% of 
property values will be lost due to an increase in hurricane wind speeds. Therefore, hurricane hazards can 
alter the relative weight between structural resilience and emission abatement. A higher wind speed 
motivates building structure reinforcement but discourages efforts to reduce GHGs. Despite this, payoffs 
from improved resilience can barely compensate for the increase in property damages induced by stronger 
hurricane winds. Higher hurricane hazards in the future will inevitably increase financial losses and total 
GHG emissions.  
 
  
(a) Resilience investment percentage 
 






0 5 10 15 20 25 30











0 5 10 15 20 25 30
%









(c) Total expected damage value (d) Total GHG reduction 
 
Figure 4.4  Changes in county resilience and emission performance with increased hurricane winds 
4.5.2 County climate policy implications 
As suggested by the results of the previous section, structural resilience can be effectively enhanced by 
providing insurance premium discounts for hurricane mitigation measures. A key underlying assumption is 
that premium discounts must be equal to property damages avoided through hurricane mitigation measures. 
If this assumption does not hold (e.g., a higher discount is offered), the avoided property damages may be 
unable to compensate for the county’s increased expenditures on insurance subsidies. The county will suffer 
from a deficit even with a more resilient building network. As indicated by Figure 4.5, if the premium 
discount is increased by 20%, the county’s expenditures on insurance subsidies will reach $112,280, which 
is 18.7% higher than the avoided property damages. This will result in an annual deficit of $18,700 due to 
subsidies for hurricane mitigation measures. However, if the premium discount is reduced by 20%, the 
county will gain from subsidy savings but will run risks of incurring higher property damages. Thus, it is 
pivotal for the county’s policy makers to accurately estimate expected property damages and thereby tailor 
premium discounts to individual buildings. As property damages often change with hurricane occurrence, 




















































Figure 4.5  Impacts of premium discounts on property damages and insurance subsidies 
 
In addition to enhancing structural resilience, the county’s climate policies should also focus on cost-
effective ways to reduce GHG emissions in the long run. As indicated by the results shown in Figure 4.3, 
on average, a mere 33.6% retrofit budget is used for emission abatement. This share is even lower for 
buildings with high property values. If viewed over a 30-year period, the share of investments in emission 
abatement show a decreasing trend when future hurricane risks are accounted for. This trend will be more 
notable when risks are higher than expected as suggested by Figure 4.4(d). Existing low and fluctuating 
carbon prices in voluntary trading markets do not create sufficient incentives for project proponents to 
invest in GHG abatements. There is a need to introduce new policies at the county level to engage abatement 
efforts, and especially for buildings with high property values. As part of incentive policies, financial 
subsidies can be provided for emission abatement measures that are voluntarily installed on buildings. 
Subsidies could strictly target high-valued buildings that are subject to serious economic losses when 
hurricane events occur. As illustrated by Figure 4.6, total GHG emissions can be reduced by 11.7% when 
a 5% discount on technology investments is offered for buildings with property values of more than $150 
per square feet. The reduction percentage can reach 24.1% when a 20% discount is offered. The county’s 
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5% to 20%. Costs for each unit of emission reduction increase from $4.16/MT CO2 to $17.2/MT CO2. Costs 
are closed to current carbon prices in voluntary markets, and thus technology subsidies can be considered 
as a cost-effective way to further reduce this county’s GHG emissions. As a higher discount level 
corresponds to less GHG emissions but larger government expenditures, the county is advised to choose a 




Figure 4.6  Changes in emission reductions and subsidies with technology discounts 
 
4.6 Summary 
Increased climate risks present challenges of combining climate mitigation and adaptation goals into 
building designs. These two goals are often misaligned, as adaptation measures use additional materials 
and equipment that are sources of GHG emissions. In turn, the design of buildings involves making 
tradeoffs between enhancing structural resilience and reducing GHG emissions. In this study, tradeoffs are 
made by determining optimal investment allocation between emission abatement and hurricane mitigation 
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portfolio for building retrofits in hurricane-prone regions. The value of enhancing structural resilience is 
demonstrated through a case study on Anne Arundel County. When property damages induced by hurricane 
winds are accounted for, the county prioritizes the need for adaptation measures over traditional emission 
abatements. On average, 66.4% of the budget for building retrofitting is used to improve structural 
resilience, and this percentage is expected to increase as hurricane risks continue to rise in this county. For 
the 76 commercial buildings studied herein, the optimal portfolio generates $77,000 in revenue from carbon 
sales, saves $76,000 in utility bills, and reduces $70,000 in property damages each year, far exceeding 
payoffs when solely invested in emission abatement.    
Structural resilience investment is motivated by providing insurance premium discounts for hurricane 
mitigation measures. The effectiveness of this policy approach mainly depends on whether discounts can 
truly reflect property damages avoided by using such measures. If discounts are offered at higher rates than 
they should be, the county will suffer from a deficit even with a more resilient building network in place. 
The deficit could reach approximately $18,000 per year when discounts are positively deviated by 20%. 
However, lower premium discounts lead to less resilient building networks and higher property damages, 
although the county saves expenditures on insurance subsidies. Thus, it would be wise to be cautious about 
premium discounts offered on mitigation measures and to make sure they are adjusted to reflect changes in 
hurricane-induced damages. 
As damage control is favored in investment decision making, engaging emission abatement efforts 
constitute a new challenge faced by this county in further reducing its total GHG emissions. The results of 
this study show that existing low and fluctuating carbon prices in voluntary trading markets have failed to 
create sufficient incentives, causing only 33.6% of the retrofit budget to be used for emission abatement. 
This share is even lower for buildings with high property values. There is a need to offer financial subsidies 
for emission abatement measures that are voluntarily put in place for buildings. The results also show that 




subsidies. This policy helps reconcile low-carbon and resilience goals without compromising the economic 
viability of this county.  
While this study only analyzes the case of Anne Arundel County, similar policy implications may be 
applied to other communities that are exposed to hurricane storm damages. Based on historical hurricane 
records, the expected annual damage ratio for Miami-Dade County, Florida is 0.072, which is 4 times higher 
than the damage ratio for Anne Arundel County. Even for those areas that are considered more “safe” such 
as Washington D.C., there are still non-negligible risks of property damages (the damage ratio is 0.007). 
The success of the county’s climate actions are dependent on good policy design and integration with local 
climate environments. Our study results could help guide a climate policy design that maximizes payoffs 
of emission abatement and risk mitigation. The results suggest that risk mitigation efforts should be pursued 
with discretion on the accuracy of insurance premium discounts. Meanwhile, subsidies for emission 
abatements should complement existing emission trading schemes and should be customized according to 











Chapter 5  Conclusions 
5.1 Major Findings 
This dissertation evaluates the environmental and cost effects of two baseline approaches for voluntary 
carbon trading. A project-based baseline, in principle, is capable of providing effective incentives for 
emission mitigation and is strict in environmental integrity. However, the baseline’s feasibility is 
conditional on the ability of an accurate prediction of BAU emissions. The results indicate that at least for 
the commercial building sector, the uncertainty in predicting BAU emissions can lead to a great deal of 
non-additional offsets generated by the voluntary program and selling the non-additional offsets to the 
compliance programs can result in one of the following consequences. If the compliance entities are not 
able to tighten their own emission caps in response, which is mostly likely to occur in practice, there will 
be a net increase of global emissions by approximately 53 million metric tons per year. If the compliance 
entities are tightened, increased emissions can be prevented but the payment for non-additional offsets will 
exceed $1 billion per year. These results assume the offsets include the self-profitable reductions due to 
utility savings. To the extent that these savings are treated to be non-additional, the potential for the project-
based baseline may be even bleaker than suggested in this study. 
The performance baseline, in contrast, is more adaptive to the uncertainty of the BAU emission prediction 
as the total amount of non-additional offsets does not significantly increase due to the allowance of 
imperfect information. The performance baseline also reveals a decreasing trend as the emission 
differences among individuals diminish over time. This is an obvious advantage because the inability to 
make precise predictions about building emissions, particularly over a 30-year time horizon, is to be 
expected. Even using an advanced energy demand model can err by up to 35% (Yu et al., 2010). In addition, 
the performance baseline streamlines the verification process by eliminating the need for project 
proponents to verify their individual project baselines. This characteristic further reduces transaction 





However, the effectiveness of the performance baselines relies on an important assumption that the 
baselines are set by regulators who have either perfect or imperfect information about the costs and emissions 
of projects. In practice, regulators are often less informed than project proponents; therefore, the baselines are 
more likely to be privately defined even for sectoral crediting. The primary concern with privately defined 
baselines is that baseline developers may exert their powers to manipulate the baselines, leading to increases in 
sectoral emission caps. The theoretical results show that the extent to which the baseline is manipulated is 
highly dependent on who is assigned as the baseline developer. The more the baseline developer emits, the 
more likely the developer manipulates the baseline. The results are further discussed in the context of the U.S. 
commercial building sector, where empirical methods are introduced to characterize cost and revenue 
functions. The empirical analysis reveals that, because of the notably low price elasticity of the offset supply, 
baselines are often positively biased even with third-party verifications. The biased baselines would produce 
up to 852 gram of non-additional offsets per square feet of building space and result in approximately 700 
million metric tons of carbon leakage in compliance programs each year.   
In practice, the consequence of the privately defined baseline is restricted due to third-party verification. 
Any proposed baseline should be reviewed by independent verification bodies not involved in monitoring 
and reporting, who check that the baseline is determined in compliance with the relevant guidelines. 
Nevertheless, any verification body needs to address the necessary trade-offs between cost and uncertainty, 
especially when faced with multiple small emission sources, e.g., single buildings. The allowance for 
uncertainty leaves the baseline developer with a chance to benefit from a manipulated baseline. This study 
indicates that even with the third-party verification, the baseline developer still has strong motivation to 
deviate from the unbiased baseline and produce non-additional carbon offsets. Once the offsets are sold to 
the entities regulated by compliance programs, the emission caps are implicitly extended, which can result 
in approximately seven 700 metric tons of carbon leakage each year.  




are implemented in the areas that exposure to significant risks of catastrophic events such as hurricanes and 
floods. The result indicates that existing low and fluctuant carbon prices in the voluntary trading markets failed 
to provide sufficient incentives, leading to only 33.6% of the retrofit budget used for emission abatement. The 
share is even lower for the buildings with high property values. When hurricane damages are accounted for, 
there is a transition from long-advocated low-carbon investment to a risk-oriented portfolio for building retrofits 
in hurricane-prone regions. The values of enhancing structural resilience are demonstrated in a case of Anne 
Arundel County, which prioritizes the need for adaptation measures over traditional emission abatements. On 
average, 66.4% of the budget for building retrofit is used to improve structural resilience, and this percentage 
is expected to increase as hurricane risks continue to rise in this county. For the 76 commercial buildings studied 
herein, the optimal portfolio generates $77,000 in revenues from carbon sales, saves $76,000 in utility bills, 
and reduces $70,000 in property damages each year, far exceeding payoffs when solely invested in emission 
abatement.    
5.2 Policy Implications 
As project-based baselines have been widely used for mitigation projects, regulators are advised to be 
cautious regarding the prediction errors of their BAU emissions and implement the baseline while updating 
on the conservative side. For the projects that want to adopt the project-based baseline for future crediting, 
it is suggested that qualifications are evaluated based on the project nature and that permits are issued only 
to the projects whose emissions are relatively easy to predict. Performance baselines are more suitable to 
those sectors that have a complicated emission mechanism.  
When performance baselines are allowed to be privately defined, regulators should focus on the buildings 
that emit less than their peers in the sector. This implies that an “open to all” policy might not be the most 
plausible option. Instead, baseline setting might be implemented on an invitation-only basis to specific emitters 




emission performances are among the top 20% of comparable peers as the baseline developers can enable the 
offset program to achieve a net reduction of global emissions. 
Increased climate risks emphasizes the need for tradeoffs between enhancing structural resilience and 
reducing GHG emissions. Structural resilience can be enhanced by providing insurance premium discounts 
for hurricane mitigation measures. The effectiveness of this policy mainly depends on whether the discounts 
can truly reflect the property damages avoided by using those measures. When the discounts are offered 
higher than they should be, the county will suffer from a deficit even with a more resilient building network. 
The deficit could reach approximately $18,000 per year when the discounts are positively deviated by 20%. 
However, lower premium discounts lead to less resilient building network and higher property damages 
although the county saves expenditures on insurance subsidies. Thus, it would be wise to be cautious about 
premium discounts offered on the mitigation measures and to make sure they are adjusted to reflect changes 
in hurricane-induced damages. 
As damage control is favored in investment decision making, engaging emission abatement efforts 
constitute a new challenge faced by this county in further reducing its total GHG emissions. The results of 
this study show that existing low and fluctuating carbon prices in voluntary trading markets have failed to 
create sufficient incentives, causing only 33.6% of the retrofit budget to be used for emission abatement. 
This share is even lower for buildings with high property values. There is a need to offer financial subsidies 
for emission abatement measures that are voluntarily put in place for buildings. The results also show that 
total GHG emissions can be further reduced by up to 24% through reasonable expenditures on technology 
subsidies. This policy helps reconcile low-carbon and resilience goals without compromising the economic 






Appendix A:  Solving for the Optimal Emission Reduction 
Recall the optimization problem in Equation 2.2: 
max
𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡(𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡) + ℂ(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1 
s. t.   𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
         𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(A1) 
The cost function in Equation A1 is specified in Equation 2.5 as the follow. 
ℂ(𝑞) = 𝛽1𝑞
2 + 𝛽2𝑞
2 ∙ 𝑇𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑞
2 ∙ 𝐻𝑢 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 (A2) 
For a given firm 𝑖, 𝑇𝑒 and 𝐻𝑢 are constant. Thus, Equation A2 can be rewritten as the follow. 
ℂ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜅𝑞𝑖
2 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, where 𝜅 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐻𝑢 (A3) 
Plugging Equation A.3 into Equation A.1, the optimization problem becomes 
max
𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) − 𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
2
+ 𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 + 𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1 
(A4) 
Equation A4 is solved as a finite-period problem (t = 1, …, N). The firms make abatement decisions 
only within the N periods. The technologies that have been adopted continue to reduce emissions beyond 
t = N, but no more technology will be added beginning from t = N+1. Thus, the cumulative annual 
emission reduction 𝑞𝑖,𝑡=𝑛+1,…,⋈ = 𝑞𝑖,𝑁. The terminal value 𝜋𝑖,𝑁+1 is defined as the follow. 








[𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑁] 
(A5) 







𝜋𝑖,𝑁 = 𝑝𝑁(𝑏𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁) − 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁
2 + 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1
2 +






[𝑝𝑁(𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑁]  
(A6) 





− 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 (A7) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑁










Plugging Equations A.7 to A.9 into Equation A.6 yields the following optimal value function at t=N.  
𝜋𝑖,𝑁
∗ = 𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑁+𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1−𝛽)
− ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁 (
𝑝𝑁+𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1−𝛽)









[𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑁+𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1−𝛽)






∗ , the objective function at t = N-1 can be expressed as the follow. 
max
𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1







∗  satisfies Equation A10. Taking the first order condition of Equation A11 with respect to 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1 





− 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−2 (A12) 
Based on the expression of 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1
∗  (Eq. A12) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑁
∗  (Eq. A7), the form of 𝑟𝑖,𝑡





− 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 (A13) 





∗ = 𝑝𝑡 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑡+𝛾𝑡
2𝜅(1−𝛽)
− ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡 (
𝑝𝑡+𝛾𝑡
2𝜅(1−𝛽)







∗   








∗   
(A15) 
where 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∗  satisfies Equation A14. Taking the first order condition of Equation A.15 with respect to 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1 





− 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−2 (A16) 
The guessed form is verified. Therefore, the optimal emission reduction 𝑟𝑖,𝑡









Appendix B: Solving for the Optimal Baseline 
1. Interval 1: 𝒃 ≥ 𝒛
∗
 - all the firms participate in the program 








, 𝜃, 𝜂, 𝛾 > 0 (B1) 
Rewrite this equation as a function of price: 
𝑧𝑖







, 𝜃, 𝜂, 𝛾 > 0 (B2) 
According to Equation 3.11, the relationship between offset price and offset supply is  
𝑝 = ℙ(b; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = 𝑣1𝑠 + 𝑣2𝑅𝑒, 𝑣1 < 0 (B3) 
Plugging Equations B2 and B3 into the supply function 𝑠 = 𝕊(𝑏; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = ∑ max (𝑏 − 𝑧𝑖
∗, 0)𝑁𝑖=1 , 
the offset price p can be expressed as a function of baseline 𝑏𝐼. 
𝑝 = ℙ(𝑏𝐼) = 𝐶𝑏𝐼 + 𝐷 =
𝜐1𝑁




𝜐1 ∑ 𝐵𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑅𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1




According to Equation 3.3, the optimal baseline 𝑏𝐼 satisfies 
max𝑏𝐼,𝑞1𝜃ℙ(𝑏
𝐼)(𝑏𝐼 − 𝑧𝑖
0 + 𝑞1) + ℍ(𝑏
𝐼) + ℝ(𝑞1)] − ℂ(𝑞𝑖) 
(B5) 
s.t.   ℍ(𝑏𝐼; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = 𝜃𝜏𝕊(𝑏𝐼; 𝑧𝑖
∗) − 𝑓 
        ℂ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜂𝑞𝑖
2, 𝜂 > 0 
        ℝ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝛾𝑞𝑖, 𝛾 > 0 
         𝑏𝐼 ≥ 𝑧
∗
 
Plugging Equation B4 into the objective function B5 and taking the first order condition with 





















(𝐶𝑏𝐼∗ + 𝐷 + 𝛾) 
(B7) 
The expressions of C and D can be found from Equation B4. Combining Equations B6 and B7, 

















) , 𝜏 > 0, 𝜈1 < 0 (B8) 










where C and D can be found from Equation B4. 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 can be found from Equation B2. 
 
2. Interval 2: 𝟎 ≤ 𝒃 < 𝒛
∗
 − a proportion of firms participate in the program 
 
The total offset supply is  
 





Plugging Equation B10 into Equation B3, the offset price becomes 
 
𝑝 = ℙ(𝑏𝐼𝐼) = 𝑋𝑏𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌 =
𝕊𝐼(𝑏𝐼∗)
𝑏𝐼∗
𝑏𝐼𝐼 + 𝜈2𝑅𝑒, 𝑋 < 0 (B11) 
 
According to Equation 3.3, the optimal baseline 𝑏𝐼𝐼 satisfies 
max𝑏𝐼𝐼,𝑞1𝜃ℙ(𝑏
𝐼𝐼)(𝑏𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑖
0 + 𝑞1) + ℍ(𝑏
𝐼𝐼) + ℝ(𝑞1)] − ℂ(𝑞𝑖) 
(B12) s.t.   ℍ(𝑏𝐼𝐼; 𝑧𝑖
∗) = 𝜃𝜏𝕊𝐼𝐼(𝑏𝐼𝐼; 𝑧𝑖
∗) − 𝑓 
          ℂ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜂𝑞𝑖




          ℝ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝛾𝑞𝑖, 𝛾 > 0 
           0 ≤ 𝑏𝐼𝐼 < 𝑧
∗
 
Plugging Equation B11 into the objective function B12 and taking the first order condition with 


















(𝑋𝑏𝐼∗ + 𝑌 + 𝛾) (B14) 
The expressions of X and Y can be found from Equation B11. Combining Equations B13 and 






















Appendix C: Methods for determining building value (𝑽𝟎) and extended time (𝒕𝒓 − 𝒕𝒊) 
Building values (𝑉0) are estimated using the sales comparison approach. The premise of this approach 
is that a buyer would pay no more for a building than others are paying for similar buildings in the current 
market. The similar buildings chosen in this chapter are the buildings that are the same type, similar floor 
space (differences are less than 20%), and they are located within a radius of 5 miles. The sales prices of 
the similar buildings are adjusted for differences with the subject building. The differences relate to size, 
age and market conditions at the time of sale. The values of comparable transactions are adjusted upward 
(downward) for undesirable (desirable) differences with the subject building. The value adjustment are 
based on the following: 
▪ Building age: properties are assumed to depreciate at 2% per annum. If a comparable building is sold 
at $5,000,000 and is five years older than the subject, an upward adjustment of $500,000 is made 
[$500,000 × 2% × 5 years]. 
▪ Sale year: the sale prices are assumed to appreciate 0.5% per month over the past three years. If a 
comparable building is sold at $5,000,000 a year ago, an upward adjustment of $300,000 is made 
[$500,000 × 0.5% × 12 months].   
▪ Floor space: The adjusted sales price of each comparable building is divided by its size in square feet. 
The results of all the comparable buildings are averaged and applied to the subject building. 
 
Post-disaster restoration involves processes of estimating damage, determining work load, obtaining 
funding, cleaning up, and construction. The extended time required for these processes (𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖) is often 
determined by a combination of complicated project-specific factors. They may include level of damages, 
funding availability, accessibility to work zones, local policies, etc. In a situation that the information is not 
fully accessible, the estimation of extended time can be simplified to only rely on the level of damage. 




the time required for substantial completion of repairs and reconstruction after Hurricane Iniki. The average 
extended times are listed in Table C-1 and can be used as inputs of the resilience metric when project-
specific data are not available.  
 
Table C- 1  Extended time required for post-hurricane restoration 
Loss of building value 
Average extended 
time (months) 
Complete demolition without rebuild 10 
20% ≤ (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟)/𝑉0 < 40% 14 
40% ≤ (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟)/𝑉0 < 50% 15 




Appendix D: Hurricane damage evaluation 
The building damages caused by hurricanes are estimated based on the study of Huang et al. (2001), 
who proposed a calculation formula for building damage ratio using Southeastern U.S. insurance data from 
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew. The damage ratio is defined as the total premium paid by the insurer over 
the total insured value. The damage ratio is calculated as follows. 
 
𝐸(𝑥) = {
0.01 exp(0.252𝑥 − 5.823) , 𝑥 ≤ 41.4𝑚/𝑠
1                                                ,          𝑥 > 41.4𝑚/𝑠
 (D1) 
 
where 𝐸(𝑥) is the expected building damage ratio caused by a hurricane. 𝑥 is the ten-minute sustained 
wind speed. As the wind speed (𝑣) in Section 4.3.1 refers to the 1-min sustained wind speed, a factor of 
𝑐 = 0.9 is used to convert  𝑣 to 𝑥, expressed as 𝑥 = 0.9𝑣. 
In a very short time interval (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡] in which at most one hurricane could occur, the probability that 
the hurricane damage (E) exceeds e is as follows (Li et al., 2016). 
 
Pr(𝐸 > 𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡 ∙ [1 − 𝐹𝐸(𝑒, 𝑡)] ∙ 𝑑𝑡 (D2) 
 
where 𝐹𝐸(∙) is the CDF of damage ratio 𝐸(∙). According to Equations 4.4 and D1, 𝐹𝐸(∙) can be expressed 
as follows. 








41.4, 𝑡) ,              𝑥 = 1.0
 (D3) 
where 𝐸−1(∙) is the inverse function of the damage ratio. c=0.9 is a factor that converts the 1-min sustained 




Let ℎ(𝑒, 𝑡) denote the probability of the damage ratio exceeding a threshold 𝑒. Based on Equations D2 
and D3, ℎ(𝑒, 𝑡) is derived and presented in Equation 4.10. The expected annual damage at year t, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡, is 
presented in Equation 4.11. Therefore, without any hurricane mitigation measure being adopted, the loss of 
building value should be equal to the expected annual damage (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑟 = 𝑀𝑡).   
ℎ(𝑒, 𝑡) =
Pr (𝐸 > 𝑒)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 [1 − 𝐹 (
1
𝑐
𝐸−1(𝑒), 𝑡)] (D4) 
where 𝜆𝑡 is the hurricane occurrence rate and assumed to be time-varying due to climate change, 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆0 +
𝑟𝜆𝑡. The failure rate function ℎ(𝑒, 𝑡) describes the probability of a prescribed hurricane damage within 
(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡] as 𝑑𝑡 → 0. It accounts for the variation of the damage probability over time through the non-
stationarity description of wind speeds.  
To estimate the expected hurricane damage (𝑀𝑖,𝑡), a time period (𝑇1, 𝑇2] is divided into N equal time 
intervals (𝑇1, 𝑡1], (𝑡1, 𝑡2]⋯ (𝑡𝑁−1, 𝑇2] . The duration of each interval is ∆𝑇 = (𝑇2 − 𝑇1)/𝑁 → 0 as 𝑁 → ∞. 
Let 𝐸𝑖 denote the damage ratio caused by the hurricane wind during the k
th time interval. The CDF 𝐹𝐸𝑘(𝑥, 𝑡) 
can be obtained in Equation D-5. The shape of 𝐹𝐸𝑘(𝑥, 𝑡)  has a “jump” at x=1, corresponding to the 
probability Pr(𝐸𝑡 = 1) that is the probability of the 10-min sustained wind speed exceeding 41.4 m/s 
according to Equation D3. Thus, the expected hurricane damage ratio during the kth time interval can be 
obtained in Equation D6. 
𝐹𝐸𝑘(𝑥, 𝑡) = Pr(𝐸𝑘 < 𝑥) = 1 − ℎ(𝑥, 𝑡) ∙ ∆𝑇 (D5) 






Let denote 𝐸𝑡 the total damage ratio during a time period (𝑇1, 𝑇2] = (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡] where t represent year. 𝐸𝑡 
is the integration of 𝐸𝑖 during this period. The total expected damage at year t  𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸(𝐸𝑡) ∙ 𝑉0. Thus, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
is expressed as follows. 












Appendix E: Solving for the Optimal Investment Allocation 
Recall the optimization problem in Equation 4.1: 
𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑎𝑖,𝑡
Π𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 −𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽Π𝑖,𝑡+1 
𝒔. 𝒕.   𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  
         𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,0 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
   𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑡 
(E1) 
The functions of utility saving (𝑦𝑖,𝑡), abatement cost (𝑐𝑖,𝑡) and expected annual damage (𝑚𝑖,𝑡) are 
specified in Equations 4.11, 4.10 and 4.8, respectively. They are listed as follows. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝕐(𝑞𝑖,t) = 𝛾𝑞𝑖,𝑡 (E2) 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ℂ(𝑞𝑖,t) = 𝛽1𝑞𝑖,t
2 + 𝛽2𝑞𝑖,t
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦1 + 𝛽3𝑞𝑖,t
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦2 (E3) 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝔸(𝑘𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 −  𝜔 ∙ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡) (E4) 
For a given building 𝑖, 𝐷𝑦1 and 𝐷𝑦2 are constant. Thus, Equation E3 can be rewritten as the following. 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ℂ(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜅𝑞𝑖
2, where 𝜅 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐷𝑦2 (E5) 
Plugging Equations E2, E4 and E5 into Equation E1, the optimization problem becomes 
𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝑟𝑖,𝑡,   𝑎𝑖,𝑡
Π𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
− 𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
2 + 𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ [1 −  𝜔 ∙ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡)]
+ 𝛽Π𝑖,𝑡+1 
(E6) 
Equation E6 is solved as a finite-period problem (t = 1, …, N). The project proponents make abatement 
decisions only within the N periods. The technologies that have been adopted continue to reduce emissions 
beyond t = N, but no more technology will be added beginning from t = N+1. Thus, the cumulative annual 




The terminal value 𝜋𝑖,𝑁+1 is defined as the following. 








[𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 −  𝜔 ∙ 𝑘𝑖,𝑁)]  
(E7) 
The optimization problem is solved backward. When t = N, the value function is 
𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝑟𝑖,𝑁,   𝑎𝑖,𝑁
Π𝑖,𝑁 = 𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁 −∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁) − 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁
2
+ 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1
2−𝑀𝑖,𝑁 ∙ [1 −  𝜔 ∙ (𝑘𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑁)] + 𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑁+1
+ 𝜆𝑁[𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁
2 − 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1
2 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑁 − 𝐹𝑁]
= 𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁)
− 𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁)
2 + 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1




[𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡𝑞𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑁
∙ (1 −  𝜔 ∙ 𝑘𝑖,𝑁)] + 𝜆𝑁[𝜅(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁)
2 − 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1
2 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑁 − 𝐹𝑁] 
(E8) 





2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁)
− 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 (E9) 
𝑎𝑖,𝑁
∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑁−1 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁










∗ = 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁
∗ =
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁)
 (E12) 
𝑧𝑖,𝑁
∗ = 𝑧0 −
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 +𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁)





∗ = 𝑘𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑁
∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑁 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁




Plugging Equations E9 to E14 into Equation E8 yields the following optimal value function at t=N.  
Π𝑖,𝑁
∗ = 𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑁 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁
2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁)
− ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁 (
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁












[𝑝𝑁 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁




2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁)
− 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∙ (1 −  𝜔 ∙ {𝐹𝑖,𝑁 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑁 + 𝛾𝑁



























= 𝑝𝑁−1 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−2 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1 − ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑁−1(𝑞𝑖,𝑁−2
+ 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1) − 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−1
2 + 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑁−2




2 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑁−1 − 𝐹𝑁−1] 
(E16) 
where Π𝑖,𝑁
∗  satisfies Equation E15. Taking the first order condition of Equation E16 with respect to 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1 







2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑁−1)
− 𝑞𝑖,𝑁−2 (E17) 
𝑎𝑖,𝑁−1
∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑁−1 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑁−2 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑁−1 + 𝛾𝑁−1





Based on the expression of 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1
∗  (Eq. E17) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑁
∗  (Eq. E9), and the expression of 𝑎𝑖,𝑁−1
∗  (Eq. E18) 
and 𝑎𝑖,𝑁
∗  (Eq. E10), the forms of 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗  and 𝑎𝑖,𝑡




2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 +𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑡)
− 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 (E19) 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡




Plugging Equations E19 and E20 into Equation E15 yields the following optimal value function at t.  
Π𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝑝𝑡 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖,0 +
𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡
2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 +𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑡)
− ∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡 (
𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡









∙ {1 − 𝜔 {𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡









Π𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑝𝑡−1 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑖,0 + 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 −∑𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑡−1(𝑞𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1)
− 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝜅𝑞𝑖,𝑡−2




∗  satisfies Equation E21. Taking the first order condition of Equation E22 with respect to 𝑟𝑖,𝑁−1 




2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1)





∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡−1




The guessed form is verified. Therefore, the optimal emission reduction 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗  and the optimal mitigation 
investment 𝑎𝑖,𝑡




2𝜅(1 − 𝛽 +𝜔𝑀𝑖,𝑡)
− 𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 (E25) 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜅 [
𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡










Appendix F: Modelling parameters for Anne Arundel County 
Based on the recorded hurricane data in this county, it is found that the two Weibull 
parameters are: 𝑢 = 23.3𝑚/𝑠 and 𝛼 = 3.5. As indicated by Figure F-1, the fitted Weibull 
distribution can well represent the actual wind speed data for this county. A 10% increase in 
the average wind speed 𝑢 is assumed for the next 50 years, which suggests that the annual 
increment rate is  𝑟𝑢 = 0.0466. The annual number of hurricane 𝜆𝑡 is also assumed to increase 
by 10%. Given 𝜆0 = 0.174, the annual increment rate 𝑟𝜆 = 0.0003.    
 
 
Figure F-1 Maximum sustained 1-min wind speed of Anne Arundel’s hurricanes 
The emission abatement measures described in Section 2.3.3 are applied to the buildings 
in this county to estimate emission reduction cost (𝑐𝑖,𝑡) using the OpenStudio PAT. The cost is 
described as a function of emission reduction (𝑞𝑖,𝑡) and building types (𝐷𝑦1, 𝐷𝑦2) in Equation 
4.10. The dummy variables for building types are (-0.5, 1) for medium offices, (1, -0.5) for 
small offices, and (-0.5, -0.5) for warehouses. The regression result shows that the model is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and the R-squared is 0.9193. The coefficient 























Table F-1  Estimated coefficients for emission abatement cost function 
Variables Coefficient Standard error P-value 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡
2  2.74×10-4 3.24×10-5 0.000 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦1 -4.27×10
-4 6.47×10-5 0.000 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡
2 ∙ 𝐷𝑦2 -4.66×10
-4 6.45×10-5 0.000 
Note: The number of observation is 63. F(3,60)=227.75.  
R-squared is 0.9193. Adjusted R-squared is 0.9152. 
 
Utility saving (𝑦𝑖,𝑡) is described as a function of emission reduction (𝑞𝑖,𝑡) in Equation 4.11. 
As electricity is a major energy source for building, electricity saving is used to approximate 
utility saving from emission abatement. Electricity price in Anne Arundel County is 12.5 
cent/kWh. The electricity emission factor is 1,002 lbs/MWh (TCR, 2015). Electricity saving 










Variables Unit Description 
𝑏𝑖,𝑡 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Additionality baseline 
𝑥 NA ASHRAE Energy Standard 
𝑧 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Annual GHG emission 
𝑖𝑐 $/sq.ft Incremental technology cost 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Cumulative emission abatement 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Annual emission abatement 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 $/sq.ft Total lifecycle payoffs 
𝑠 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Annual supply to carbon offset 
ω𝑗 NA 
Probability that the privately defined baseline b at level j can be 
verified even if it is higher than the unbiased baseline 𝑏0 
𝑏∗ gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) The optimal adjusted baseline under verification 
𝑏𝑎 gCO2e/(sq.ft· yr) Adjusted baseline output from Monte Carlo simulation 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 $/(sq.ft· yr) Expected annual damage due to hurricanes 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡 $/(sq.ft· yr) Expected annual damage without mitigation measures 
𝑅𝑓 NA Resilience metric 
ℎ(𝑥, 𝑡) NA Probability of the damage ratio exceeding a threshold 𝑥 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 $/(sq.ft· yr) Annual hurricane mitigation investment 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 $/(sq.ft· yr) Incremental hurricane mitigation investment 
 
Parameters Unit Description 
𝑝 $/g CO2e Carbon price 





𝜖𝑖,𝑡 g CO2e/sq.ft Emission adjustment due to an external environment change 
𝛽 NA Discount factor 
𝛼𝑖 NA Parameters to be estimated in Equation 1.4 
𝑇𝑎 F Air temperature 
𝐵𝑛 NA Direct radiation 
𝐷𝑦𝑘 NA Dummy variables representing the energy standard 
𝐸𝑓 gCO2/Btu Grid emission factor 
𝑇𝑒 NA Temperature difference. 1 for zones 1 to 4 and 2 for zones 5 to 7 
Hu NA 
Humidity difference. 1 for the zones with the letter A (dry) and 2 for 
the zones with the letter B (moist) or C (marine). 
𝜃 NA A factor that convert a uniform annual revenue to a present value 
𝜏 $/gCO2e Compensation fee 
𝜂 NA 
A parameter in Equation 3.9 showing the change of technology 
costs with emission reductions 
𝜈1 NA 
A parameter in Equation 3.11 showing the change of offset price 
with offset supply 
𝑣2 NA 
A parameter in Equation 3.11 showing the change of offset price 
with offset supply 
C NA An expression referred to Equation B-4 
D NA An expression referred to Equation B-4 
X NA An expression referred to Equation B-11 
Y NA An expression referred to Equation B-11 
N NA Total number of buildings 
𝑓 NA Verification fee 
𝑅𝑒 NA 
A dummy variable representing the region where the provider is 





𝐹𝑡 $/(sq.ft· yr) Total annual retrofit budget 
V $/sq.ft Building value 
𝑡𝑖 year Time to failure 
𝑡𝑟 year Time to recovery 
𝜆𝑡 NA Mean occurrence rate of hurricane 
𝑢𝑡 NA Weibull parameter for Equation 4.4 
𝑟𝑢 NA Annual increment rate in parameter 𝑢𝑡 
𝛼𝑡 NA Weibull parameter for Equation 4.4 
𝑣 m/s 1 min sustained wind speed 
𝜌𝑖,𝑡 NA Replacement cost ratio 
𝜔 NA A constant coefficient for Equation 4.9 
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 NA Premium discounts offered to insured buildings 
 
Functions Unit Description 
ℕ(∙) NA Net present value of the annual paybacks 
ℂ(∙) NA Building retrofit costs 
𝕊(∙) NA Annual supply of carbon offset 
ℙ(∙) NA Carbon price as a function of baseline 
ℍ(∙) NA Baseline developer’s compensation as a function of baseline 
ℝ(∙) NA Utility savings as a function of cumulative emission 
𝔾(∙) NA Net increase of global emission 
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